Unified programming environment for programmable devices

ABSTRACT

A secure programming system can receive a job control package having a security kernel and a target payload of content for programming into a pre-defined set of trusted devices. A device programmer can install a security kernel on the trusted devices and reboot the trusted devices using the security kernel to validate the proper operation of the security kernel. The target payload can then be securely installed on the trusted devices and validated.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS AND PRIORITY CLAIM

This application claims benefit as a Continuation of U.S. applicationSer. No. 16/121,469, filed Sep. 4, 2018 which is a Continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 15/717,925, filed Sep. 27, 2017, now U.S. Pat. No.10,069,633, issued Sep. 4, 2018, which claims the benefit of U.S.Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 62/401,953 filed Sep. 30, 2016,the entire contents of the aforementioned are hereby incorporated byreference as if fully set forth herein, under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Theapplicant(s) hereby rescind any disclaimer of claim scope in the parentapplication(s) or the prosecution history thereof and advise the USPTOthat the claims in this application may be broader than any claim in theparent application(s).

This application is related to Provisional Application Ser. No.62/371,184, entitled COUNTERFEIT PREVENTION, filed Aug. 4, 2016,Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/372,242, entitled EMBEDDINGFOUNDATIONAL ROOT OF TRUST USING SECURITY ALGORITHMS, filed Aug. 8,2016, Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/369,304, entitled DEVICEPROGRAMMING WITH SYSTEM GENERATION, filed Aug. 1, 2016, each of which isowned by Applicant and is incorporated herein in its entirety by thisreference thereto.

TECHNICAL FIELD

Embodiments relate generally to device programming systems, and, morespecifically, to a uniform programming environment for secureprogramming systems.

BACKGROUND

The approaches described in this section are approaches that could bepursued, but not necessarily approaches that have been previouslyconceived or pursued. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, it shouldnot be assumed that any of the approaches described in this sectionqualify as prior art merely by virtue of their inclusion in thissection.

Certain operations of electronic circuit board assembly are performedaway from the main production assembly lines. While various feedermachines and robotic handling systems populate electronic circuit boardswith integrated circuits, the operations related to processingintegrated circuits, such as programming, testing, calibration, andmeasurement are generally performed in separate areas on separateequipment rather than being integrated into the main production assemblylines.

Customizable devices such as Flash memories (Flash), electricallyerasable programmable read only memories (EEPROM), programmable logicdevices (PLDs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), andmicrocontrollers incorporating non-volatile memory elements, can beconfigured with separate programming equipment, which is often locatedin a separate area from the circuit board assembly lines. In addition,system level components, such as smart phones, circuit boards, Internetof Things (IoT) devices, media players, can also require specificsecurity configuration support.

The systems and sub-assemblies that are manufactured or assembled inbulk on a manufacturing line are generally functionally identical. Suchproducts share similar problems in regards to functionality andoperation. Issues manifesting in one device are typically found in allsimilarly manufactured devices.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention is illustrated by way of example, and not by wayof limitation, in the figures of the accompanying drawings and in whichlike reference numerals refer to similar elements and in which:

FIG. 1 depicts an illustrative view of a secure programming system,according to an embodiment;

FIG. 2 depicts an example of a programmer;

FIG. 3 depicts an example of a trusted device;

FIG. 4 depicts an example of a data device;

FIG. 5 depicts an example of a device identification;

FIG. 6 depicts an example block diagram of a secure programming system;

FIG. 7 depicts an example of a second block diagram of the secureprogramming system;

FIG. 8 is an example of provisioning one of the trusted devices;

FIG. 9 is an example of a manufacturing flow for the trusted devices;

FIG. 10 is an example of a root of trust data flow for the trusteddevices;

FIG. 11 is an example of a secure device manufacturing flow;

FIG. 12 is an example of the secure programming process flow;

FIG. 13 is an example of a device birth certificate;

FIG. 14 is an example of a secure programming environment;

FIG. 15 is an example of a manufacturing flow with security algorithms;

FIG. 16 is an example of a secure boot use case;

FIG. 17 is an example of a device provisioning use case;

FIG. 18 is an example of a tamper detection use case;

FIG. 19 is an example of an internet of things use case;

FIG. 20 is an example of a security and data programming use case;

FIG. 21 is an example of an off device seed and certificate generationuse case;

FIG. 22 is an example of an on device seed and certificate generationuse case;

FIG. 23 is an example of a managed and security processing system;

FIG. 24 is a detailed example of a secure element use case;

FIG. 25 is an example of a secure provisioning process flow for theprogrammable devices;

FIG. 26 is an example of a secure programming process flow; and

FIG. 27 is block diagram of a computer system upon which embodiments ofthe invention may be implemented.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description, for the purposes of explanation, numerousspecific details are set forth in order to provide a thoroughunderstanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however,that the present invention may be practiced without these specificdetails. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shownin block diagram form in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring thepresent invention.

Embodiments are described herein according to the following outline:

1.0. General Overview

2.0. Structural Overview

3.0. Functional Overview

4.0. Example Embodiments

5.0. Implementation Mechanism—Hardware Overview

6.0. Extensions and Alternatives

1.0. General Overview

Approaches, techniques, and mechanisms are disclosed for provisioningprogrammable devices in a secure manner. The secure programming systemcan individually encrypt a target payload of data and code and thenprogram the information into each individual one of the programmabledevices. The secure programming system can create a customized payloadpackage that can only be decrypted by a system or device having thecorrect security keys.

The programmable devices can include memory chips, circuit boards, andcomplete electronic devices such as smart phones, media players, orother consumer and industrial electronic devices. The configuration ofthe security keys can control the operation of the programmable devices.

The secure programming system can securely configure individual devicesincluding components, circuit boards, and complete products. Byimplementing security features at the individual component manufacturingtime, operation can be controlled on a device by device basis. Thesecure content, executable code, and keys can interoperate to provide ahigh degree of security and control.

According to one embodiment, the system can install the security kernelinto the programmable device mounted in the programmer and then rebootthe programmable device in the programmer to validate the securitykernel before provisioning the programmable device with the targetpayload. This can validate that the security kernel is properlyinstalled in the programmable device.

According to another embodiment, by individually encrypting a targetpayload on one of the programmable devices, such as a circuit board,then the circuit board can be configured to only work with componentsthat have registered security codes. This can be used to ensure thatcircuit boards can only be operated with certain category parts. Thisprovides the manufacturer with a degree of control over the final use ofthe boards.

According to another embodiment, the programmable devices can validate aserial number or other parameter as a prerequisite for provisioning ofthe programmable device. In yet another embodiment, the system can limitoperation based on the security codes in a job control package. This canprevent duplication or unauthorized provisioning of the programmabledevices.

In other aspects, the invention encompasses computer apparatuses andcomputer-readable media configured to carry out the foregoingtechniques.

2.0. Structural Overview

FIG. 1 illustrates an illustrative view of various aspects of a secureprogramming system 100 in which the techniques described herein may bepracticed, according to an embodiment. The secure programming system 100can individually configure data devices and active, trusted device withcryptographic information to provide a secure programming and operationenvironment.

The secure programming system 100 comprises a programming unit 110having a programmer 112, a security controller 114, security keys 106,adapters for coupling to programmable devices, a first security module116, a second security module 118, and an nth security module 120. Thesecure programming system 100 can be coupled to a security master system104 having a secure master storage system 102. The security mastersystem 104 and the secure master storage system 102 can generate andsecurely store the security keys 106 for encrypting and decryptinginformation. The security keys 106 can implement a variety of securityparadigms. For example, the security keys 106 can include key pairs 150having a private key 152 and a public key 154. The key pairs 150 can beused to implement a public key cryptography system where data encryptedby the public key 154 can be decrypted using the private key 152. Thesecure programming system 100 can include as many different key pairs150 as necessary. The key pairs 150, the private key 152, and the publickey 154 can be implemented for different devices or system elementsincluding the secure programming system 100, the programming unit 110,the programmer 112, the security controller 114, the security modules,the programmable devices 128, the data devices 132, the trusted devices130, or any other system element. The security keys 106 can be used witha variety of devices including hardware security modules (HSM), atrusted security module (TPM), microprocessors, microcontrollers,dedicated security units, or a combination thereof.

The system 100 comprises one or more computing devices. These one ormore computing devices comprise any combination of hardware and softwareconfigured to implement the various logical components described herein,including components of the programming unit 110 having the programmer112, the security controller 114, the adapters, the first securitymodule 116, the second security module 118, and the nth security module120. For example, the one or more computing devices may include one ormore memories storing instructions for implementing the variouscomponents described herein, one or more hardware processors configuredto execute the instructions stored in the one or more memories, andvarious data repositories in the one or more memories for storing datastructures utilized and manipulated by the various components.

The programming unit 110 can be a secure system for programming data,metadata, and code onto the programmable devices 128. The programmingunit 110 can receive security information from the security mastersystem 104, process the information, and transfer an individuallyconfigured version of the security information to the programmabledevices 128.

The programming unit 110 can include the programmer 112. The programmer112 can be an electromechanical system for physically programming theprogrammable devices 128. For example, the programmer 112 can receive atray containing the programmable devices 128, electrically couple theprogrammable devices 128 to an adapter unit, and transfer securityinformation into the programmable devices 128. The programming unit 110can receive individualized status information from each of theprogrammable devices 128 and customize the security informationtransferred to each of the programmable devices 128 on an individualdevice basis. For example, each of the programmable devices 128 canreceive an individual block of information that is different from theinformation transferred to others of the programmable devices.

The programmer 112 can be coupled to one or more of the adapters thatcan be used to access the programmable devices 128. The adapters caninclude a first adapter 122, a second adapter 124, and a nth adapter126.

In an illustrative example, the first adapter 122 can be a hardwaredevice that can be used to electrically connect one or more of theprogrammable devices to the programmer 112. The programmer 112 can thentransfer a version of the security information to one of theprogrammable devices 128. The first adapter 122 can include one or moresockets for mounting the programmable devices 128. The first adapter 122can include a socket, a connector, a zero-insertion-force (ZIF) socket,or a similar device to mounting integrated circuits.

Although the adapters are described as electromechanical units formounting the programmable devices 128, it is understood that theadapters can have other implementations as well. For example, if theprogrammable devices 128 are independent electronic devices, such as acell phone, a consumer electronic device, a circuit board, or a similardevice with active components, then the adapters can include mechanismsto communicate with the programmable devices 128. The adapters caninclude a cable link, a Universal Serial Bus link, a serial connection,a parallel connection, a wireless communication link, an electronic databus interface, an optical interface, or any other communicationmechanism.

The programmable devices 128 are devices that can be provisioned withsecure information by the programming unit 110. For example, theprogrammable devices 128 can include data devices such as Flash memoryunits, programmable read only memories, secure data storage devices, orother data storage devices. The programmable devices 128 can alsoinclude logic devices such as microcontroller units, microprocessorunits, programmable logic units, application-specific integrated circuit(ASIC), field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), or other programmablelogic devices.

Provisioning may include transferring data and/or code information to adevice. For example, a flash memory unit can be provisioned byprogramming it with data.

The programmable devices 128 can also include trusted devices 130 thatinclude security data and security programming information. For example,the programmable devices 128 can include trusted devices 130 such ascell phones, hardware security modules, trusted programming modules,circuit board, or similar devices.

The data devices 132 can include any number of devices, e.g., a firstdata device 134, a second data device 136, and a nth data device 138.The trusted devices 130 can include any number of trusted devices, e.g.,a first trusted device 140, a second trusted device 142, and up to a nthtrusted device 144.

The programmable devices 128 can each be provisioned with individuallycustomized security information. Thus, each of the programmable devices128 can include a separate set of the security keys 106 that can be usedto individually encrypt the data stored in programmable devices 128.This provides the ability to encrypt security information 148differently on each of the programmable devices 128 to maximizesecurity. Each of the programmable devices 128 can be personalized withindividual security keys 106.

The programmable devices 128 can be configured to include paired devices146. The paired devices 146 are two or more of the programmable devices128 that can share one or more of the security keys 106. This can alloweach of the paired devices 146 to detect and authenticate another of thepaired devices 146 in the same group. Thus data from one of the paireddevices 146 can be shared with another one of the paired devices 146.This can allow functionality such as sharing information, authenticatinga bi-directional secure communication channel between two or more of thepaired devices 146, identifying other related devices, or a combinationthereof. The new key pairs can be stored in a database, a manufacturingexecution system, or other data system where the information can beretrieve later to detect device tampering, counterfeit devices,versioning problems, or a combination thereof.

In an illustrative example, the secure programming system 100 can beused to establish one of the paired devices 146 having the first datadevice 134, such as a system information module (SIM) chip, paired withthe first trusted device 140, such as a smart phone. In thisconfiguration, the first data device 134 and the first trusted device140 can both be programmed with the security keys 106 for the paireddevices 146. Thus the first trusted device 140 can validate the securityinformation 148, such as a serial number, of the first data device 134to authenticate that the first trusted device 140 is allowed to use theother information on the first data device 134.

The programming unit 110 can include a security controller 114 coupledto the programmer 112. The security controller 114 are computing devicesfor processing security information. The security controller 114 caninclude specific cryptographic and computational hardware to facilitythe processing of the cryptographic information. For example, thesecurity controller 114 can include a quantum computer, parallelcomputing circuitry, field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) configured toprocess security information, a co-processor, an array logic unit, amicroprocessor, or a combination thereof.

The security controller 114 can be a secure device specially configuredto prevent unauthorized access to security information at the input,intermediate, or final stages of processing the security information.The security controller 114 can provide a secure execution environmentfor code elements to execute in. For example, the security controller114 can be a hardware security module (HSM), a microprocessor, a trustedsecurity module (TPM), a dedicated security unit, or a combinationthereof. The security controller 114 can be part of the programming unit110. For example, the security controller 114, such as a hardwaresecurity module, can be included within the programmer 112.

The security controller 114 can be coupled to security modules toprovide specific security functionality. The security modules caninclude a first security module 116, a second security module 118, and anth security module 120. Each of the security modules can provide aspecific security functionality such as identification, authentication,encryption, decryption, validation, code signing, data extraction, or acombination thereof. For example, the security modules can be hardware,software, or a combination thereof. In another example, a secureprogramming environment 108 can be implemented using a configurationhaving the programmer 112, the security controller 114 implemented usinga hardware security module, the first security module 116 implementing aserial number server module to secure provide valid serial number forthe programmable devices 128, and appropriate security keys.

For example, the first security module 116 can be configured to providean application programming interface (API) to a standardized set ofcommonly used security functions. In another example, the secondsecurity module 118 can be a combination of dedicated hardware andsoftware to provide faster encryption and decryption of data.

The programming unit 110 can include the secure storage of one or morethe security keys 106. The security keys 106 can be calculated internalto the secure programming system 100, can be calculated externally andreceived by the secure programming system 100, or a combination thereof.In addition, each of the internal devices and components of the secureprogramming system 100 can communicate with other external and internalcomponents using communication interfaces (not shown) that support thetransfer of information between the devices and components. It isunderstood that each of the elements of the diagrams can communicatewith other elements using the communication interfaces. Thecommunication interfaces are omitted from the figures for clarity.

The security keys 106 can be used to encrypt and decrypt the securityinformation. The security keys 106 can be used to implement differentsecurity methodologies and protocols. For example, the security keys 106can be used to implement a public key encryption system. In anotherexample, the security keys 106 can be used to implement a differentsecurity protocol or methodology. Although the security keys 106 can bedescribed as used for a public key encryption system, it is understoodthat the security keys 106 can be used to implement different securityparadigms, such as symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption, or othersecurity protocols.

One of the advantages of the secure programming system 100 includes theability to provision each of the programmable devices 128 with adifferent set of the security keys 106 and a different version of thesecurity information 148 encrypted by the individual security keys 106.This can ensure that the security keys 106 used to decrypt the securityinformation 148 on one of the programmable devices 128 cannot be used todecrypt the security information on another one of the programmabledevices 128. Each of the programmable devices 128 can have a separateone of the security keys 106 to provide maximum protection.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example of the programmer 112. The programmer 112is an electromechanical device for provisioning the programmable devices128.

The programmer 112 can be used to access the programmable devices 128and provision the programmable devices 128 with the content payload. Thecontent payload can include data, code, security keys 106 of FIG. 1, thesecurity information 148 of FIG. 1, and other related content.

The programmer 112 can have a variety of configurations. The programmer112 can include a programming processor 202, an input device receptacle206, device adapters 208, destination sockets 210, a device placementunit 212, and an output device receptacle 214. For example, theprogrammer 112 can be a programmer 112, a chip programmer, a deviceprovisioning system, a circuit board programmer, or a similarprovisioning system.

The programmer 112 can have a programmer identification 216. Theprogrammer identification 216 is a unique value for identifying theprogrammer 112.

The programmer 112 can configure the programmable devices 128 byinitializing and writing a data image into the programmable devices 128.The data image can be configured for the device type of the programmabledevices 128. The programmer 112 can transfer the data to theprogrammable devices 128 using direct or indirect memory access.

The programmer 112 can receive a payload image for the programmabledevices 128 and store the image in a local programmer storage unit.Although only the payload image is described as a single image, it isunderstood that the payload image can include multiple code images. Forexample, the payload image can be a file archive holding severaldifferent executable images and data. One image could provide a secureboot or kernel capability, while one of the other images can provideother functionality. The payload image can be processed into individualimages targeted for each of the programmable devices 128. Configuringthe programmable devices 128 can store memory structure, cryptographicdata, and user data on the programmable devices 128. Configuring caninclude forming one-time structures such as partitions on theprogrammable devices 128.

The programmer 112 can include the programming processor 202. Theprogramming processor 202 is a computing unit for controlling theprogrammer 112. The programming processor 202 can include a centralprocessing unit (not shown), a programmer storage unit 204, acommunication interface (not shown), and a software (not shown).

The programming processor 202 can have a variety of configurations. Forexample, the programming processor 202 can include the securitycontroller or be coupled to the system controller. The programmingprocessor 202 can be a single processor, a multiprocessor, a cloudcomputing element, or a combination thereof.

The programmer storage unit 204 is a device for storing and retrievinginformation. For example, the programmer storage unit 204 of theprogrammer 112 can be a disk drive, a solid-state memory, an opticalstorage device, or a combination thereof.

The programmer 112 can include the software for operating the programmer204. The software is control information for executing on theprogramming processor 202. The software can be stored in the programmerstorage unit 204 and executed on the programming processor 202.

The programmer 112 can include the input device receptacle 206. Theinput device receptacle 206 is a source of the programmable devices 128.For example, the input device receptacle 206 can be a tray that conformsto the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) standards. Theinput device receptacle 206 can be used for holding unprogrammeddevices.

The programmer 112 can include the output device receptacle 214. Theoutput device receptacle 214 is a destination for the programmabledevices 128 that have been provisioned. For example, the output devicereceptacle 214 can be an empty JEDEC tray for holding finished devices,a storage tube, a shipping package, or other similar structure.

The programmer 112 can include the device adapters 208. The deviceadapters 208 are mechanisms for coupling to the programmable devices128. For example, the device adapters 208 can include the first adapter122 of FIG. 1, the second adapter 124 of FIG. 1, and the nth adapter 126of FIG. 1.

The device adapters 208 can have a variety of configurations. Forexample, the device adapters 208 can include destination sockets 210 formounting the programmable devices 128 such as chips. The sockets aremechanisms for holding and interfacing with the programmable devices128. The device adapters 208 can be modular and removable from theprogrammer 112 to accommodate different socket configurations. Thedevice adapters 208 can include a latch mechanism (not shown) forattaching to the programmer 112.

The destination sockets 210 can hold the programmable devices 128. Thedestination sockets 210 can be used to read or write new information tothe programmable devices 128.

The programmer 112 can include the device placement unit 212. The deviceplacement unit 212 is a mechanism for positioning the programmabledevices 128 in one of the destination sockets 210.

The device placement unit 212 can be implemented in a variety of ways.For example, the device placement unit 212 can be a robotic arm, a pickand place mechanism, or a combination thereof. Although the deviceplacement unit 212 can be described as a rail-based positioning system,it is understood that any system capable of positioning one of theprogrammable devices 128 in the destination sockets 210 can be used.

The device placement unit 212 can retrieve one or more of theprogrammable devices 128 that are blank from the input device receptacle206. The device placement unit 212 can transfer the programmable devices128 to the destination sockets 210 of the device adapters 208.

Once the programmable devices 128 are engaged and secured by the deviceadapters 208, the device programming process can begin. The programmer112 can program a local copy of the information into the programmabledevices 128 in one of the destination sockets 210. For example, thelocal copy of the programming information can be in a pre-programmedmaster device, from a file in local storage, or from a remote server.The information programmed into the programmable devices 128 can beunique and customized for each of the programmable devices 128. Forexample, the information can be specifically customized based on thedevice identification of each of the individual programmable devices128. The programmer 112 can program each of the programmable devices 128with a different image and is not limited to duplicating the same datain each device.

Once programming is complete, the device placement unit 212 cantransport the programmable devices 128 that have been programmed to theoutput device receptacle 214. The device placement unit 212 cantransports any of the programmable devices 128 that have errors to areject bin (not shown).

The programmer 112 can include a programmer identification 216. Theprogrammer identification 216 is a unique value for the programmer 112.The programmer identification 216 can be used to identify the programmer112. The programmer identification 216 can be incorporated into a deviceidentification of each of the programmable devices 128 to indicate whichprogrammer 112 was used to program the devices.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of the trusted devices 130. The trusteddevices 130 are components having the secure storage unit 326 and thesecure execution unit 324. The trusted devices 130 are active componentscapable of executing secure code in the secure execution unit 324 toperform operations on the secure data in the secure storage unit 326.

The trusted devices 130 can be provisioned by the secure programmingsystem 100 of FIG. 1 to include security information. For example, thetrusted devices 130 can include the device identification 302, securityalgorithms 304, a security certificate 306 and the key pairs 150 eachhaving the private key 152 and the public key 154.

In an illustrative example, the security keys 106 of FIG. 1 can compriseone or more of the key pairs 150 for a public key encryption system. Thesecurity information can be encrypted with the public key 154 of one ofthe key pairs 150 and decrypted using the private key 152. However, itis understood that the system can take advantage of different securityparadigms including symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption, dataencryption standard (DES), hash codes, PGP, or other cryptographicsystems. In a further example, the key pairs 150 can be used to providea digital signature using two different sets of the security keys 106.In the digital signature example, a message or payload can be encryptedusing the private key 152 of a first element and the public key 154 of asecond element. The resulting encrypted message can be decrypted usingthe public key 154 of the first element and the private key 152 of thesecond element. If the message is successfully decrypted, then it showsthat the message was encrypted by the first element thus established thedigital signature.

The device identification 302 is a data value that can uniquely identifyeach of the trusted devices 130 individually. For example, the deviceidentification 302 can include serial numbers, markers, security codes,or a combination thereof.

The security algorithms 304 are code elements 314 used to implementsecurity features. The security algorithms 304 can provide anapplication programming interface to external systems to controlsecurity functionality on the trusted devices 130. The securityalgorithms 304 can be customized to each of the trusted devices 130. Forexample, the security algorithms 304 can include the code elements 314such as source code, executable code, a library module, a link module,configuration files, initialization data, hardware control code, or acombination thereof.

The security certificate 306 is a security object associated with one ofthe trusted devices 130. The security certificate 306 can bepre-programmed to certify that a device has a particular root of trustembedded in it. The security certificate 306 can have one or more of thepublic key 154 in them. The security certificate 306 can include or belinked to security data such as key pairs 150, security keys 106,encrypted passwords, or a combination thereof.

The security certificate 306 can be a securely stored data element. Forexample, the security certificate 306 can be encrypted securityinformation that must be decrypted before use.

The key pairs 150 can be security elements having two or more separatesecurity keys used to encrypt and decrypt data. For example, the keypairs 150 can include the private key 152 and the public key 154. Thesecurity information encrypted with the public key 154 can be decryptedusing the private key 152.

The key pairs 150 can be implemented in a variety of ways. For example,the key pairs 150 can be configured to have different key lengths tochange the level of security. The private key 152 and the public key 154can be implemented with the same or different character lengths.

Although the key pairs 150 are described in the context of a public keyencryption system, it is understood that the key pairs 150 can also beused to implement other encryption paradigms. For example, the key pairs150 can be used for symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption,standards based encryption, hashing algorithms, or any other encryptionsystem.

The trusted devices 130 can include security functionality implementedas security modules. For example, the trusted devices 130 can include anidentification module 316, an authentication module 320, a cryptographymodule 318, and a code signing module 322.

The identification module 316 can verify the identification of one ofthe programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1. The identification module 316can receive the device identification 302 of one of the programmabledevices 128 and determine if the device identification 302 is correct.For example, the device identification 320 can be compared to a list ofknown devices, compared against a checksum, compared using acomputational algorithm, or similar techniques.

The authentication module 320 can authenticate one or more of theproperties of one of the programmable devices 128. The authenticationmodule 320 can receive the device identification 302, the securityparameters including one or more of the security keys 106 to determineif the security parameter provided is valid. The authentication module320 can also be used to validate the device identification 302.

The validity of the security parameter can be determined in a variety ofways. For example, the validity of the security parameter can bevalidated by successfully decoding the security parameter using one ofthe security keys available to one of the trusted devices 130. Inanother example, the validity of the security parameters can bevalidated by decrypting one of the security parameters and comparing itto a predefined value stored within one of the trusted devices 130.

The cryptography module 318 is a unit for performing cryptographicoperations. The cryptography module 318 can provide an interface toperform computationally intensive operations such as encryption anddecryption. The other security modules can be coupled with thecryptography module 318 to provide security functionality.

The cryptography module 318 can be implemented in a variety of ways. Forexample, the cryptography module 318 can include hardware, software, ora combination thereof. The cryptography module 318 can provide astandardized interface to allow the other security modules to performthe required cryptographic functions.

The code signing module 322 is a unit for securing code elements 314.The code signing module 322 can be used for securing the code element314 and can encrypt code elements, decrypt code elements, and controlthe execution of the code elements. The code signing module 322 can beused to ensure that one of the code elements 314 can be executed on oneof the trusted devices 130 by verifying that the security informationassociated with the code element 314.

In an illustrative example, each of the code elements 314 can include anexecution parameter that indicates the model number of the trusteddevices 130 where the code elements 314 are authorized to execute. Thecode signing module 322 can be used to validate the execution parameter,compare the parameter to the model number information in one of thetrusted devices 130, and only allow execution of the code elements 314if the two values match. This could be used to limit operation of thecode element 314 to a particular high end phone or other specificdevice.

One of the advantages of the trusted devices 130 is that the trusteddevices 130 can identify and authenticate the security informationinternally to increase the level of security. The trusted devices 130can validate the security information using the security keys 106 storedin the secure storage unit 326.

The trusted devices 130 can provide a measure of trust when the trusteddevices 130 are secure. The trusted devices 130 can have a variety ofconfigurations. For example, the trusted devices 130 can have a systemidentification, an authentication mechanism, encryption and decryptionfunctionality, code signing to protect executables, trusted storage, anda trusted execution environment.

The system identification can include elements that identify or describehardware and software components. The trusted devices 130 can have theability to securely authenticate its identity and other properties. Thetrusted devices must be able to securely encrypt and decryptinformation. The trusted devices 130 must be able to authenticatetrusted code. The trusted devices must have secure storage and executioncapability.

The secure programming system 100 must be able to implement a system ofroots of trust. The roots of trust (RoT) are a set of functions in atrusted computing environment that are always trusted by the system. Forexample, the roots of trust can serve as a separate secure computeengine controlling the trusted computing platform cryptographic process.Alternatively, devices can implement the roots of trust as hardware andsoftware components that are inherently trusted. They are secure bydesign and can be implemented in hardware or protected by hardware. Theycan be used to perform security critical functions such as measuring orverifying software, protecting cryptographic keys, and performing deviceauthentication.

The roots of trust can provide a variety of security functionalityincluding: on the fly encryption, detection and reporting of tamperingwith secure data, detection of active tampering attempts, digital rightsmanagement, and other security functions.

Implementing secure operation in a mobile hardware space is difficultbecause of the higher risk resulting from physical access to thedevices. Such secure devices require the hardware to work closely withprotected data and software to insure secure operation.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of the data devices 132. The data devices132 are components having the secure storage unit 326. The data devices132 are passive components capable storing the secure data in the securestorage unit 326 and providing access to the stored data when accessedby one of the trusted devices 130 of FIG. 1.

The data devices 132 can be provisioned by the secure programming system100 of FIG. 1 to include security information. For example, the datadevices 132 can include the device identification 302, the securityalgorithms 304, the security certificate 306 of FIG. 3, and the keypairs 150 each having the private key 152 and the public key 154. Inthis case, the data within the secure storage unit 326 may be internallyaccessed from within the data devices 132.

The secure storage unit 326 can be used as a write once data area.Information can be programmed into the secure storage unit 326 and thenthe secure storage unit 326 can be processed to eliminate the access tothe data within the secure storage unit 326 from outside the datadevices 132.

In an illustrative example, one of the data devices 132 can be a flashmemory device. Within the flash memory device, the flash memory can bepartitioned into different blocks. Some of the blocks can be used toprovide general memory space. Some of the other blocks may be configuredto be private and used to store information that is not accessible fromoutside the flash memory drive. A private block can be used to form thesecure storage unit 326.

In another example, the secure storage unit 326 can be a dedicatedmemory area on one of the data devices 132 that is protected by asecurity fuse. The data can be written to the secure storage unit 326and then external access can be eliminated by blowing the security fuse.

Each of the data devices 132 can include a trusted certificate 402. Thetrusted certificate 402 is a data structure that can include othersecurity parameters. For example, the trusted certificate 402 caninclude the device identification 302, the security algorithms 304, oneor more of the public key 154, and other security information.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of the device identification 302. Thedevice identification 302 is a data structure that can be used touniquely identify one of the programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1, thesecure programming system 100 of FIG. 1, the programmer 112 of FIG. 1,or a combination thereof. The device identification 302 can be used todescribe the programmable devices 128 including the data devices 132 ofFIG. 1 and the trusted devices 130 of FIG. 1.

The device identification 302 can have a variety of configurations. Forexample, the device identification 302 can include an incoming root oftrust 504, serial number markers 512, firmware markers 506,manufacturing markers 510, product markers 508, operating markers 514,original equipment manufacturer markers 516 (OEM markers), the key pairs150, or similar markers.

The incoming root of trust 504 is a security element. The incoming rootof trust 504 can be programmed into one of the programmable devices 128at manufacture or programming time. For example, the incoming root oftrust 504 can be a serial number and a key value. In another example,the incoming root of trust 504 can be an embedded identifier, such as adevice identifier implanted at silicon creation time in one of theprogrammable devices 128. The incoming root of trust 504 can be checkedagainst a known set of values if created at manufacturer or can berecorded if created during programming for later cross check inproduction and or in application, service and repair stage. The incomingroot of trust 504 can be stored in a database, the MES, or a similardata system.

The serial number markers 512 are security elements that can include aserial number for one of the programmable devices 128. The deviceidentification 302 can include one or more of the serial number markers512.

The firmware markers 506 are security elements that can describe oridentify the firmware used in one of the programmable devices 128. Thefirmware markers 506 can include a version number, a calculated checksumvalue, a partial or complete hash value, a text string identifier, anumeric identifier, or a combination thereof. For example, one of theprogrammable devices 128 can be a circuit board having firmwareinstalled on the board. The firmware markers 506 can identify theversion number for each separate firmware element. The firmware versioninformation could be used to coordinate interoperability between codeelements 314 of FIG. 3 in the programmable devices 128. In anotherexample, the firmware markers 506 can include a calculated hashchecksum, such as a MD5 hash or fingerprint. The hash checksum can beused to verify the data integrity of the firmware by comparing the hashchecksum against a hash calculated against the live version of thefirmware. Any difference would indicate that the firmware has beenmodified.

The manufacturing markers 510 are security identifiers that can describeone or more manufacturing properties. For example, one of theprogrammable devices 128 can include the manufacturing markers 510 suchas location information, programmer identification, programming unitidentification, manufacturing time information, manufacturing locationinformation, time windows, manufacturing execution system identificationinformation, factory identification, vendor identification,manufacturing equipment information, or manufacturing relatedparameters.

The product markers 508 are security elements that can describe theproducts used with the programmable devices 128. The product markers 508can include related manufacturers, branding information, product lineinformation, model information, or other product related parameters.

The operating markers 514 are security elements that can describe theoperating properties for the programmable devices 128. The operatingmarkers 514 can include operating voltage, voltage patterns, currentlevels, power draw, heating factors, critical operating frequencies,operating sequence information, or operating parameters.

The OEM markers 516 are security elements that can describe the originalequipment manufacturers or related contract manufacturers who can usethe programmable devices 128. The OEM markers 516 can includemanufacturer identifiers, license information, time windows, authorizedlocations, authorized factories, product lot size, serial number ranges,or other OEM related parameters.

The device identification 302 is a multi-variable data structure thatincludes security information for the programmable devices 128. The dataelements of the device identification 302 can be individually encryptedwithin the device identification 302. The device identification 302itself can be encrypted. The device identification 302 can be specificto each one of the programmable devices 128 both in terms of the dataelements forming the device identification 302 and the degree ofencryption and other security mechanisms used to protect the deviceidentification 302 itself. The device identification 302 can include thepublic key 154 of FIG. 1 linked to the private key 152 of FIG. 1 of thekey pairs 150 associated with one of the programmable devices 128.

One of many advantages of the device identification 302 is theenablement of access to specific data elements within the deviceidentification 302 by decrypting only the elements required. Byencrypting both the device identification 302 and the individual dataelements, a finer granularity of security can be provided.

The device identification 302 can be incorporated into a device birthcertificate 520. The device birth certificate 520 can include the deviceidentification 302 and additional manufacturing and device lifecycleinformation. The device birth certificate 520 can be used to track andauthenticate the stages of the device lifecycles for the programmabledevices 128. The device birth certificate 520 can be generated as partof the programming process and is programmed into each of theprogrammable devices 128. The device birth certificate 520 is describedin detail below.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example block diagram of the secure programmingsystem 100. The secure programming system 100 includes a number ofsecure objects, such as a first secure object 602 and a second secureobject 604. The first secure object 602 may interface or communicatewith the second secure object 604.

The secure objects represent any hardware or software objects havingsecurity mechanisms or protocols for protection from unauthorizedinterception or duplication. For example, the secure objects mayinclude, but is not limited to, one of the data devices 132 of FIG. 1,one of the trusted devices 134 of FIG. 1, an electronic component, anelectronic device, a boot loader, a firmware (FW), an operating system(OS), a software application, a hardware programmer, a peripheraldevice, a website, a machine, etc.

The first secure object 602 may interface with the identification module316, the authentication module 320, the cryptography module 318, and thecode signing module 322. For illustrative purposes, although the secondsecure object 604 is shown connected only with the first secure object602, the second secure object 604 may also be connected with anycombination of the identification module 316, the cryptography module318, the authentication module 320, the code signing module 322. Thefirst secure object 602 or the second secure object 604 is protectedfrom security breach using, but is not limited to, a combination of theidentification module 316, the cryptography module 318, theauthentication module 320, the code signing module 322, any other units,modules, or functions of the secure programming system 100.

The identification module 316 generates an identity of a secure objectto protect the secure object from an unauthorized access to the secureobject. The identification module 316 extracts identification tokens 624(ID tokens). The ID tokens 624 include information that is employed toverify an identity before access to a secure object is granted. The IDtokens 624 may include, but are not limited to, a user identification, aserial number of a device, a device identification, etc.

The ID tokens 624 may be extracted by the identification module 316using any secure information or mechanism, including, but is not limitedto, a root of trust code 620 (RoT code) and a root of trust data 622(RoT data). For example, the RoT data 622 may represent informationassociated with a digital birth certificate of a device.

The term root of trust (RoT) referred to herein refers to a set offunctions in a trusted or secured computing module that includeshardware components, software components, or a combination of hardwareand software components. For example, these functions may be implementedin, but are not limited to, a boot firmware, a hardware initializationunit, a cross-checking component/chip, etc. Also, for example, thefunctions may be implemented using, but is not limited to, a separatecompute engine that controls operations of a cryptographic processor.

The ID tokens 624 may be extracted from the RoT data 622 using the RoTcode 620. The ID tokens 624 may be cryptographically protected and somay be decrypted only by the RoT code 620. The ID tokens 624 may beunique such that each secure object has its own identification and sonone of the secure objects shares its identification with another secureobject.

The RoT code 620 includes instructions or commands that are used todecipher data that may be used to identify a source of a device or todecode content. The RoT data 622 includes information that is protectedand may only be decoded using the RoT code 620.

The RoT code 620 and RoT data 622 may be provided or generated by anysecure mechanisms. For example, the RoT code 620 and RoT data 622 may beprogrammed into a secure storage area of a device during programming orconfiguring the device.

Also, for example, the RoT code 620 and RoT data 622 may be sent from ahost server or system to the secure programming system 100 in a securemanner such that only the secure programming system 100, which has beenauthorized and validated to receive the RoT code 620 and RoT data 622.Further, for example, the host server or system may include the securitymaster system 104 of FIG. 1 that sends the security keys 106 of FIG. 1to the secure programming system 100 for identification orauthentication before the secure programming system 100 may be able toreceive or decrypt information from the security master system 104.

As an example, the secure storage area may include, but is not limitedto, a one-time programmable memory or any other storage areas that areknown only to authorized users or devices. As another example, thesecure storage area may include, but is not limited to, a storage ormemory that is accessible only with authorized information oridentification without which permission would be denied.

For example, the RoT code 620 and RoT data 622 may be preprogrammed intoa device, such as the secure objects, at the time when the device isprogrammed or configured before the device is integrated or operated ina production environment or system. Also, for example, the productionenvironment or system may include, but is not limited to, a portabledevice, a computer, a server, an electronic circuit board, etc.

The authentication module 320 can be used to verify whether anidentification token 624 is authorized for access to a secure object.After the identification module 316 extracts the ID tokens 624, theauthentication module 320 verifies the ID tokens 624 to identify whethera secure object is a valid object that may communicate with anauthorized system to send or receive secure information. For example, ifone of the ID tokens 624 is not valid, the secure object may not beallowed to exchange information with the programmer 112 of FIG. 1.

After the authentication module 320 verifies that the ID tokens 624 ofthe secure object is valid, the authentication module 320 may generate acombination of one of the ID tokens 624, a key token 628, and acryptographic token 626. The key token 628 includes information employedfor authentication of the ID tokens 624. The cryptographic token 626includes information employed for cryptographically encode or decodeinformation for information security or data confidentiality.

In one or more embodiments, the ID tokens 624, the key token 628, or thecryptographic token 626 may be generated from the RoT data 622 using theRoT code 620. In one or more embodiments, the ID tokens 624, the keytoken 628, or the cryptographic token 626 may be cryptographicallyprotected and so may be decrypted only by the RoT code 620.

The cryptography module 318 can provide data encryption and decryptionfor secure information exchanged between the secure objects or between asecure object and an external system. The external system that mayexchange the secure information with the secure objects may include, butis not limited to, the programmer 112, the security master system 104, ahost system, etc.

In one or more embodiments, after the identification module 316 extractsthe ID tokens 624 or the authentication module 320 validates the IDtokens 624, the cryptography module 318 may generate the ID tokens 624,the key token 628, and the cryptographic token 626. The cryptographictoken 626 may be generated by the cryptography module 318 using the RoTcode 620 to decode information from the RoT data 622.

In one or more embodiments, the cryptography module 318 may generate theID tokens 624 or the key token 628 using the cryptographic token 626 tofurther decode other information from the RoT data 622. In anembodiment, elimination of a data breach is greatly simplified using thecryptography module 318 having multiple levels of protection thatimprove information security or data confidentiality.

In one or more embodiments, the cryptography module 318 may includecryptography methods including, but is not limited to, symmetric-keycryptography, public-key cryptography, etc. For example, thecryptography module 318 may include a cryptographic method in which bothsender and receiver may share the same key or different keys that may becomputed using a predetermined algorithm.

As an example, the cryptographic method may include, but is not limitedto, block cipher methods, cryptographic hash functions, etc. As anotherexample, the cryptographic method may include, but is not limited to,Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),triple-DES, MD4 message-digest algorithm, MD5 algorithm, Secure HashAlgorithms 1 and 2, etc.

As an example, the cryptographic method may include, but is not limitedto, a public-key or an asymmetric key cryptography in which twodifferent but mathematically related keys may be used—the public key andthe private key. As another example, a public key system may beconstructed so that calculation of one key (e.g., a private key) may becomputationally infeasible from the other key (e.g., a public key), eventhough they are related. Both public and private keys may be generatedsecretly as an interrelated pair.

For example, in public-key cryptosystems, a public key may be freelydistributed, while its paired private key may remain secret. In apublic-key encryption system, a public key may be used for encryption,while a private or secret key may be used for decryption.

The code signing module 322 verifies the integrity of code informationexchanged between systems or devices. The code signing module 322 canverify whether content of exchanged information has been altered ortampered.

For example, the code signing module 322 may include a process ofdigitally signing executables or scripts to confirm a software author orgenerator and validates that an executable code or script has not beenaltered or corrupted. Also, for example, a code may be verified asaltered or corrupted since it was signed by way of, but is not limitedto, a cryptographic hash, checksum, etc.

In one or more embodiments, after the identification module 316 extractsthe ID tokens 624 or the authentication module 320 validates the IDtokens 624, the code signing module 322 may generate the ID tokens 624,the key token 628, and the cryptographic token 626. The cryptographictoken 626 may be generated by the code signing module 322 using the RoTcode 620 to decode information from the RoT data 622.

In one or more embodiments, the code signing module 322 may generate theID tokens 624 or the key token 628 using the cryptographic token 626 tofurther decode other information from the RoT data 622. In anembodiment, elimination of data breach is greatly simplified using thecode signing module 322 having multiple levels of protection thatimprove information security or data confidentiality.

A secure object, such as the first secure object 602 or a second secureobject 604, may interface with a secure execution engine 606. The secureexecution engine 606 includes a mechanism that manages or controlsoperations of the secure object. The secure execution engine 606includes a secure execution unit 324 and a secure storage unit 326.

The secure execution unit 324 is a block that executes code or computerinstructions in a protected environment. The environment in which thesecure execution unit 324 operates may create a flexible, scalablesolution to problems of creating a large-scale, wide-area secureenvironment in which only trusted, authenticated application code canoperate. The secure execution unit 324 may enable the programmer 112 andthe secure objects to work together in a secure environment.

The secure execution unit 324 may execute trusted code that have beenstored by the secure storage unit 326 when the secure objects werepreviously programmed, configured, tested, or certified before thesecure objects operate in an end-user production environment. Thetrusted code executed by the secure execution unit 324 may be signed andauthenticated.

The secure storage unit 326 stores and provides trusted code for thesecure execution unit 324 to execute. In an embodiment, secureenvironment is greatly simplified using the secure execution engine 606that stores program code in the secure storage unit 326 and executes theprogram code using the secure execution unit 324, thereby providing anadditional level of protection against data breach.

For example, the trusted code may be previously stored in a securestorage or memory area of the secure objects when the secure objectswere previously programmed, configured, tested, or certified. Also, forexample, the trusted code may be decoded by the cryptography module 318using information sent from the programmer 112 to the secure objects.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example of a second block diagram of the secureprogramming system 100. The example diagram shows a data flow of secureinformation during programming of secure objects 701.

For example, the identification tokens 624, depicted as ID1, ID2, andID3, are component level identifiers for each of the programmabledevices 128 of FIG. 1. The identification tokens 624 may include serialnumber markers 512 of the secure objects. The serial number markers 512are unique information assigned to each secure object, such as one ofthe programmable devices 128. The serial number markers 512 of a secureobject can be unique and different from another of the serial numbermarkers 512 of another secure object such that there may not be twosecure objects share the same serial number marker 512. The serialnumber markers 512 may be generated by the programmer 112 of FIG. 1 orembedded at silicon manufacture time.

An incoming root of trust 504 (In_RoT) of FIG. 5 may include, but is notlimited to a programmer identification 216 of FIG. 2. The incoming rootof trust 504, denoted as In_RoT 504, includes information that have beenpreviously programmed or configured prior to programming the secureobjects 701.

In one or more embodiments, the previously programmed information mayhave been programmed into a combination of adapters for programming thesecure objects, the programmer 112, and the secure objects. For example,the In_RoT 504 can be a serial number implanted in the secure object atsilicon manufacture time.

The manufacturing markers 510, such as P1, P2, P3, etc., may correspondwith the identification tokens 624, such as ID1, ID2, ID3, etc.,respectively. The In_RoT 504 can be used as a filter to qualify themanufacturing markers 510 to detect counterfeit devices.

The In_RoT 504 may be separate or different from the ID tokens 624. TheIn_RoT 504 may include information previously programmed that isdifferent from information to be programmed into the secure objects 701.

For example, the In_RoT 504 may include, but is not limited to, serialnumbers or unique keys that were embedded or programmed into componentsat the time of manufacturing the components. Also, for example, the timeof manufacturing the components may be, but is not limited to, a timewhen the components were manufactured at silicon level or a system levelprior to programming the components.

In one or more embodiments, the In_RoT 504 may be ingested or input by amanufacturing execution system 702 (MES). The In_RoT 504 could alsoalready reside in the MES 702 and the secure programming system 100 mayverify the correctness of the In_RoT 504. The In_RoT 504 may be combinedwith a programmer generated unique RoT, such as the ID tokens 624, togenerate a unique system-level RoT. The In_RoT 504 may includeinformation from a digital birth certificate that has been previouslyprogrammed into a component during the manufacture of the component.

The In_RoT 504 may include any number of manufacturing markers 510,denoted as P1 and P2. The manufacturing markers 510 include informationassociated with components when the components are manufactured. Forexample, the manufacturing markers 510 may include, but is not limitedto, a component ID, a programmer ID, a chip wafer location, a wafernumber, a wafer mask identifier, a location of manufacture of acomponent, a date and a time of manufacture of a component, or similarvalues.

The ID tokens 624 are component level identifiers for each of theprogrammable devices 128. Each of the ID tokens 624 can be associatedwith the manufacturing markers 510. The ID tokens 624 can be associatedwith the In_RoT 504. The In_Rot 504 could be an id, a certificate, akey, or a similar value. The In_RoT 504 can be combined with thecomponent information and registered in MES 702. This can occur beforethe programmable devices 128 are installed on one of the boards.

When the programmable devices 128 are installed on one of the boards,the MES 702 will be updated to define the relationship between the IDtokens 624 and the board id where they are installed. This allows thecalculation of the system level identifier by combining the In_RoT 504,the manufacturing markers 510, the ID tokens 624 of each of thecomponents, and the board information indicating which components areassociated with which board.

The manufacturing execution system 702 is a computerized system used inmanufacturing for product quality control purposes. The MES 702 maytrack and document transformation of raw materials to finished goods.The MES 702 may provide information about how current conditions on aplant floor can be optimized to improve production output. The MES 702work in real time to enable control of multiple elements of a productionprocess (e.g., inputs, personnel, machines, support services, etc.).

In one or more embodiments, the MES 702 may receive the In_RoT 504 alongwith the ID tokens 624 to program the programmable devices 128 and thecomponent identifiers. The In_RoT 504, the ID tokens 624, and thecomponent identifiers may be used to generate the device identification302 of one of the secure objects 701. The device identification 302includes information that is unique and associated with only one deviceor one of the secure objects 701.

The device identification 302 may include unique information that may beprogrammed into a system, such as the secure objects 701 including afirst board 712 or a second board 714. The first board 712 or a secondboard 714 are board-level systems with a number of secure objects 701assembled and connected with each other in the systems.

The first board 712 may include a system public key 154 of FIG. 1 forcryptography. The system public key 154 may be implemented in the firstboard 712 for a public key encryption system. The system public key 154may be part of one of the key pairs 150 of FIG. 1. Security informationmay be encrypted by one of the secure objects 701 using the public key154 of one of the key pairs 150 and decrypted by the first board 712using the private key 152 of FIG. 1.

The first board 712 may use the system public key 154 to encrypt secureinformation and send to one of the secure objects 701, which may decryptthe encrypted information using the private key 152. Although the systempublic key 154 is described for the first board 712, it is understoodthat a system public key may be implemented in the second board 714.

System 100 illustrates only one of many possible arrangements ofcomponents configured to provide the functionality described herein.Other arrangements may include fewer, additional, or differentcomponents, and the division of work between the components may varydepending on the arrangement. For example, in some embodiments, some ofthe security modules may be omitted, along with any other componentsrelied upon exclusively by the omitted component(s). As another example,in an embodiment, system 100 may further include multiple serial numbersor other system identifiers.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example of provisioning one of the trusted devices130. The provisioning process can program security data into theprogrammable devices 128 and associate the trusted devices 130 withanother one of the trusted devices 130. In addition, the provisioningprocess can associate the trusted devices 130 with the secureprogramming system 100.

The secure programming system 100 can encode one or more of the serialnumber markers 512 using the public key 154 of the secure programmingsystem 100 and program the encrypted values in the programmable devices128. For example, the programmable devices 128 can include a fieldprogrammable gate array 804, a programmable central processing unit 806(CPU), an embedded multimedia memory controller 808 (eMMC), a microCPU810, or a similar device.

Thus, each of the programmable devices 128 can have one of the serialnumber markers 512 that can only be decrypted using the private key 152associated with the secure programming system 100. In an illustrativeexample, the serial number markers 512 can represent a systemidentification 814 of the secure programming system 100. This canprovide a security linkage between the secure programming system 100 andthe programmable devices 128. The security linkage indicates arelationship between the secure programming system 100 and theprogrammable devices 128.

Although the provisioning process is described using the private key 152of the secure programming system 100, it is understood that one of theserial number markers 512 of a different system component can be used.For example, the programmable devices 128 can be provisioned using theserial number markers 512 for the programmer 112 of FIG. 1.

After being provisioned, the programmable devices 128 can then beinstalled on one of the trusted devices 130, such as a circuit board,that can also be provisioned with the public key 154 of the secureprogramming system 100. The circuit board can then identify theprogrammable devices 128 by decrypting the encoded values 812 andcompare the results to confirm that the serial number markers 512 match.

In another example, the secure programming system 100 can receive theserial number markers 512 for one of the trusted devices 130, such asthe circuit board, and provision the programmable devices 128 with theencoded values 812 generated by encrypting the serial number markers 512of the circuit board and programming the information into theprogrammable devices 128. After installation, the circuit board candecrypt the encoded values 812 and compare the serial number markers 512to the serial number of the circuit board.

The trusted devices 130 can be provisioned with the deviceidentification 302. The device identification 302 for one of the trusteddevices, such as the circuit board, can include the incoming root oftrust 504, the serial number markers 512, the firmware markers 506, themanufacturing markers 510, or a similar identifier. For example, theserial number markers 512 can include the identifiers ID1, ID2, and ID3associated with different types of the programmable devices 128. Each ofthe programmable devices 128 associated with the appropriate identifiercan be identified and authenticated by the circuit board where thecircuit board has been provisioned with the public key 154 of theappropriate component. ID1, ID2 and ID3 can already be recorded in theMES 702 of FIG. 7 and can be crossed checked at this stage to ensurethey have been provisioned by a trusted source. Validating the ID valuesrecorded during the provisioning stage can enable the cross checkingduring the creation of the device birth certificate 512 of FIG. 5.

Although the provisioning process is described as using the serialnumber markers 512 to identify the related and authorized systems, it isunderstood that other elements within the device identification 302 canbe used as well. For example, the programmable devices 128 can useanother portion of the device identification 302, such as themanufacturing markers 510 or the firmware markers 506, to establish thesecurity linkage between the trusted devices 130, such as the circuitboard, and the programmable devices 128.

An advantage of the encoding a portion of the device identification 302using the public key 154 associated with one of the elements of thesecure programming system 100 is to provide an authentication mechanismto limit the interoperability of the programmable devices 128 and thetrusted devices 130. By provisioning the programmable devices 128 with avalue encoded by the public key 154 of one of the elements, the trusteddevices 130 can verify that the programmable devices 128 are authorizedto operate with the trusted devices 130 using the private key 152.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a manufacturing flow 902 for thetrusted devices 130. The manufacturing flow 902 can describe thefunctionality for each stage of the manufacturing process forconfiguring the trusted devices 130 in the device life cycle.

The manufacturing flow 902 can include multiple stages for configuringthe trusted devices 130. For example, the manufacturing flow 902 caninclude a silicon design stage 904, a silicon manufacturing stage 906, aboard design stage 908, a security pre-programming stage 910, apre-programming stage 912, a board manufacturing stage 914, a deviceprovisioning stage 916, and a device operation stage 918.

In the silicon design stage 904, the design of the programmable devices128 of FIG. 1 can provide for the inclusion of the system identification814, root of trust factors, serial numbers, or other unique hardwarelevel identifiers. For example, at the silicon design stage 904, thestructure of a Flash memory unit can be configured to embed uniquehardware level identifiers in pre-defined blocks or memory locations. Inanother example, the structure of a hardware security unit can beconfigured to include storage for the unique hardware level identifiers.

In the silicon manufacturing stage 906, the trusted devices 130 can bemanufactured and configured based on the silicon design stage 904information. For example, the trusted device 130 can be configured withthe authentication module 320 and the cryptography module 322. Thetrusted devices 130 can also be configured with the values of the uniquehardware level identifiers, such as the system identification 814, rootof trust factors, serial numbers, or other similar identifiers.

In the board design stage 908, the system level board design for thetrusted devices 130 can be established. The board level design caninclude the utilization and integration of the programmable devices 128of FIG. 1, the secure execution unit 324, the secure storage unit 326,and other security related elements on the board. During the boarddesign stage 908, the integration of the programmable devices 128 ontothe board level of the other systems including another one of thetrusted devices 130 can be performed. In one example, the integration ofthe programmable devices 128 into the system board design can createanother embodiment of the trusted devices 130 by configuring the systemboard to include the programmable devices 128.

In the security pre-programming stage 910, the security certificates andother hardware level security information can be pre-calculated forprogramming into the programmable devices 128 in a later stage. Thesecurity pre-programming stage 910 can perform the security programmingfor the system. The security information may be used to certify that adevice has a particular root of trust factor or other securityinformation embedded in it. The security certificate can include thepublic key 154 of FIG. 1, encrypted data, encrypted code, or othersecurity data or keys.

The security pre-programming stage 910 can include a variety of securityactions. For example, the security pre-programming stage 910 can includereceiving the key pairs 150 of FIG. 1 having the private key 152 of FIG.1 and the public key 154 from a certification authority public keyinfrastructure unit 922 (certificate authority PKI) controlled by anexternal party, such as an original equipment manufacturer 920 (OEM). Inanother example, the security pre-programming stage 910 can receive thesystem identification 814 and the information from the authenticationmodule 320, the cryptography module 318, and the code signing module 322and prepare them for storage in the secure storage unit 326. Thecertificate authority PKI 922 can generate a security certificate. Thesecurity certificates are pre-programmed to certified that a device hasa particular root of trust embedded in it. The security certificates caninclude the public key 154 associated with a particular root of trust.For example, each of the foundational roots of trust can be embedded inthe programmable devices 128 using a separate certificate that can begenerated externally by the OEM and signed by the certificate authorityPKI 922. The private key 152 associated with the public key 154 of thekey pairs can be stored in a hidden area of the secure storage unit 326.The security certificate can be stored in a read only area of the securestorage unit 326.

The unique hardware level identifiers, such as the root of trustfactors, can be embedded into the secure storage unit 326 and enabledfor the secure execution unit 324 via security programming in thesecurity pre-programming stage. The security programming can beperformed before the pre-programming of the programmable devices 128 andcan include firmware and data programming.

Having the root of trust factors and other hardware level securityidentifiers implemented in the programmable devices 128 at design andmanufacturing time increase security and improves the level ofcounterfeit detection. The hardware level security identifiers areconfigured to be difficult to spoof and are used to authenticate thepedigree of the devices.

Further, the root of trust and hardware level security identifiers areinjected into the secure storage unit 326 using secure techniques toprovides a strong system level root of trust and increase overallsecurity. This can support the detection of counterfeit boards anddevices.

The security pre-programming stage 910 can provide varying degrees ofsupport for the secure execution unit 324 and the secure storage unit326 to accommodate different needs of manufacturers and users. Thisprovides a scalable, cost controllable, and simple process.

The security pre-programming stage 910 can provide a secret and secureprogramming process via custom tools in the programmer 112 of FIG. 1which can provide individualized security configurations for each of theprogrammable devices 128. The programmer 112 can include a standardizedset of security algorithms configured for each different device type ofthe programmable devices 128.

The secure programming system 100 of FIG. 1 provides a securemanufacturing environment by detecting and removing counterfeit devices,providing strong device identity and authentication support, and allowsdifferentiated downstream services. Extending the firmware and dataprogramming model extends data programming to security. This helpssimplify the security programming model for securing the programmabledevices 128. In an illustrative example, the silicon vendor can providethe device information, such as the In_RoT 504, serial number range, orother unique values, for each of the individual programmable devices128. The device information can then be used to detect non-registereddevices, which can then be removed as unregistered or counterfeit.

The pre-programming stage 912 can encrypt data and firmware elements andprogram the security information in the programmable devices 128 beforethe devices are installed in other systems and boards. Thepre-programming stage 912 can configure the each of the programmabledevices 128 with a unique security configuration including securityidentifiers, security keys, security algorithms, encrypted data andcode, software version numbers, cyclic redundancy codes (CRC), datasize, and other programmable information features. Such data can bestored in a database, MES, or other data system for later use.

The board manufacturing stage 914 is for implementing the informationfrom the board design stage 908. The board manufacturing stage 912 caninclude constructing the systems and boards comprising the trusteddevices 130. This can include installing the programmable devices 128for implementing the security configuration of the boards and systems.

The device provisioning stage 916 can allow for updating theprogrammable devices 128 within the trusted devices 130. For example,the programmable devices 128 can be updated using a network connection,wired or wireless, for transferring secure information to the trusteddevices 130 which can update the programmable devices 128 internally. Inanother example, the trusted devices 130 can receive updates, securitydata, additional security keys, or other security information and beconfigured outside of the secure programming system 100.

The device operation stage 918 can allow the trusted devices 130 toactively operate in the real-world. The device operation stage 918 cancover the device active time period and can last until the trusteddevices 130 reach their end of life (EOL). The device active time periodcan include the time where the trusted devices 130 are manufactured andthen operated in the real-world.

The trusted devices 130 can also receive downstream services 924 duringthe device active time period. The device active time period canencompass the device provisioning stage 916 and the device operationstage 918. The downstream services 924 can include provisioningoperations, anti-tampering actions, and updates of the firmware, theoperating systems, the applications, or other software and firmwarecomponents.

The secure manufacturing system 100 can enable secure manufacturingservices for the trusted devices 130. The secure manufacturing system100 overcomes the component level and the system level problemsexperienced by less secure systems. At the component level, fewcomponents have root of trust elements at silicon manufacture time. Thisallows the proliferation of counterfeit components because there is notmechanism to identify that pedigree of the components.

At the system level, many manufacturing systems are not embedding aseparate root of trust element at the board level that reflects thecomponent hardware and software that makes the system. This can includeinternet of things devices. In addition, some of the root of trustelements are injected into insecure storage system or are installedusing insecure methods, both of which increase the level of insecurity.

In general, there is a lack of strong system level root of trust, whichcan result in a proliferation of system/board level counterfeits.Further, the lack of standard procedures provides varying degrees ofsupport for secure storage and execution, leads to inconsistent securityat best.

Secure programming issues include the security issues related to needingcustom solutions, depending on secret programming processes usingcustomized tools, using individually customized security algorithms, andthe issues of scalability, cost and complexity.

The secure manufacturing system 100 enables secure manufacturing toallow the detection and removal of counterfeits, strong device identityand authentication, and enabling differentiated downstream services. Thesecure manufacturing system 100 extends the firmware/data programmingmodel by extending data programming to include security features andsimplifying security programming.

Adding security programming to data programming can help expand themarket for pre-programming services. This can simplify the process bycombining one algorithm for both data and security programming and helpincrease market share and adoption rates. In addition, leveragingsecurity concerns can pull programming demand from external networkvendors. Secure programming can keep keys and sensitive intellectualproperty more secure.

The secure manufacturing methodology creates strong and secure systemlevel identity. The identity of the devices is created at the birth ofthe device. It is derived from the components used to build the systemsand boards. The identity spans hardware, firmware, and softwarecomponents. The identity of the devices is unique across allmanufacturers, factories, subcontractors, and distributors. In addition,the identity can be stored securely off devices or on the devices.

A strong system identification enables a much higher level of devicesecurity, trust, and traceability for the remainder of the devicelifecycle including the device operation period. By creating a uniquesystem level identification based on existing silicon roots of trust andunique manufacturing data, the manufacturing supply change can besecured. Counterfeit parts will not have the required root of trust andcan be eliminated. In addition, compromised firmware in components andboards can be detected and flagged as an error condition. Further,downstream services can leverage system identification as a foundationto build and offer trusted services.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example of a root of trust data flow 1002 for thetrusted devices 130 of FIG. 1. The root of trust data flow 1002 candescribe the data flow of the incoming root of trust 504, the systemroot of trust 1004, and the outgoing root of trust 1006 in the devicelifecycle.

The incoming root of trust 504 can represent the roots of trust alreadyprogrammed into the component devices in a previous phase such as thesilicon manufacturing stage 906. be received by the programmer 112.

The system root of trust 1004 is a security element for componentdevices. The system root of trust 1004 can be an identifier for thesecure programming system 100 of FIG. 1, the secure programming unit 110of FIG. 1, the programmer 112, or a similar identifier. The system rootof trust 1004 represent the components comprising the system, such asthe components on a board.

The system root of trust 1004 can have a variety of configurations. Forexample, the system root of trust 1004 can include a serial number of acomponent of the secure programming system 100, a unique securityidentifier, a location of the secure programming system 100, or otherunique identifier related to the secure programming system 100.

The outgoing root of trust 1006 is a security element. The outgoing rootof trust 1006 is an identifier incorporating the incoming root of trust504 of each of the programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1 and the systemroot of trust 1004 from the secure programming system 100 or relatedcomponent. The outgoing root of trust 1006 can be programmed into eachof the trusted devices 130 to provide an individualized securityidentifier that can link the trusted devices 130 with the secureprogramming system 100.

The outgoing root of trust 1006 can be used at different stages of thedevice lifecycle. For example, the outgoing root of trust 1006 can beprogrammed into the trusted devices 130 at during the securitypre-programming stage 910 or the pre-programming stage 912. In anotherexample, the outgoing root of trust 1006 can be used duringmanufacturing to verify the trusted devices 130 during the deviceprovisioning stage 916. This verification can be used to determine if adevice is genuine including detecting counterfeit devices, unauthorizeddevices, or other improper devices. In yet another example, the outgoingroot of trust 1006 can be received by one of the trusted devices 130after manufacture and during the device operation stage 918.

The outgoing root of trust 1006 is calculated based on the incoming rootof trust 504 and the system root of trust 1004 and can have a variety ofconfigurations. For example, the outgoing root of trust 1004 can be acalculated value based on the two other roots of trust. The outgoingroot of trust can be calculated by concatenation, hashing the inputvalues, encrypting the input values, values, combining the input valuesusing a mathematical algorithm, or a combination thereof. The outgoingroot of trust 1006 can be a single value, a multiple value datastructure, an encrypted value, a clear alphanumeric value, a matrix, abinary value, or a combination thereof.

The root of trust data flow 1002 can describe the entities involved inthe overall device life cycle. For example, a silicon vendor 1008 canprovide the programmable devices 128 to be programmed by the secureprogramming system 100. The silicon vendor 1008 is involved in thedevice lifecycle during the silicon design stage 904 and the siliconmanufacturing stage 906.

An original equipment manufacturer 1010 (OEM) can be involved in thedevice lifecycle during the board design stage 908, the securitypre-programming stage 910, the pre-programming stage 912, and the boardmanufacturing stage 914. The OEM 1010 can receive the outgoing root oftrust 1006 and utilize it during the various stages. For example, theOEM 1010 can receive the outgoing root of trust 1006 and embedded it onthe board during the security pre-programming stage 910. The OEM 1010can be associated programming centers (PC) and contract manufacturing(CM) facilities that can be authorized to perform security and dataprogramming for the OEM 1010.

The device lifecycle can also address distributors 1012. The distributor1012 can provide the trusted devices 130 and provision them using theoutgoing root of trust 1006. The distributor 1012 can receive theoutgoing root of trust 1008 and distribute it to the appropriate devicesas needed.

A user 1014 can also be part of the device lifecycle. The user 1014 canreceive the outgoing root of trust 1006 and use it to enablefunctionality or content on the trusted devices 130. The outgoing rootof trust 1006 can be distributed to the users electronically, inphysical form, by direct contact, or a combination thereof.

For data, firmware, and application programming, different types ofsecurity information can be received by the trusted devices 130 usingdifferent channels during the device lifecycle based on the size of thedata. For example, at the silicon manufacturing stage 906, theprogramming information transferred for the silicon manufacturing can beless than 1 kilobytes (KB). The information transferred during thepre-programming stage 912 can typically be between 50 KB and 32gigabytes (GB). This is a typical example for the programmable devices128 of FIG. 1.

The information transferred via an internet service provider (ISP) canalso be between 50 KB and 32 GB. This information can be transferredduring the board manufacturing stage 914.

The secure programming system 100 can increase effectiveness andflexibility for secure manufacturing. The system can provide a varietyof secure manufacturing features including programming support, securityprogramming, counterfeit detection, traceability and intellectualproperty protection, trust-enabled devices, and many other securityfeatures.

The trusted devices 130 can provide secure device service and secureapplication services. For example, the trusted devices 130 can providepay per use access to third party user, device, and applicationservices. In another example, the trusted devices 130 can provide devicelevel services and user level services.

FIG. 11 illustrates an example of a secure device manufacturing flow1102. The secure device manufacturing flow 1102 can describe the dataflow of the incoming root of trust 504, a component root of trust 1104,and a board root of trust 1106 in the device lifecycle.

The secure device manufacturing flow 1102 can describe the devicelifecycle including the silicon design stage 904, the siliconmanufacturing stage 906, the board design stage 908, the pre-programmingstage 912, the board manufacturing stage 914, the device provisioningstage 916, and the device operation stage 918. The secure devicemanufacturing flow 1102 shows the implementation and embedding of theroots of trust during manufacture of the trusted devices 130.

The component root of trust 1104 is generated by combining the In_RoT504 on one of the programmable devices 128 and roots of trust that aregenerated during the programming phase. This can include the othercomponents of the device birth certificate 520.

At the board level, the board root of trust 1106 is created during theboard manufacturing stage 914. The board root of trust 1106 cannot becreated during pre-programming stage 912 because at the pre-programmingstage 912, the components have not been associated or placed on anyparticular board. The pairing of each of components, such as one of theprogrammable devices 128, with one of the boards is established duringthe board manufacturing stage 914.

When one of the trusted devices 130 is booted the first time, a softwareagent 1116, such as a boot time identifier read agent, can execute onthe trusted device 130. The software agent 1116 can read the componentroot of trust 1104 associated with the components on the board to createthe board root of trust 1106. Thus, the board root of trust 1106 isdirectly linked with each of the component root of trust 1104 of thedevices used to manufacture the board.

The system identification 814 can be formed in a variety of ways. Forexample, the system identification 814 can be a combination or hashvalue of the component root of trust 1104 of the devices installed on aparticular board.

A device certificate can be associated with one of the trusted devices130. The board root of trust 1106 can be the device birth certificatefor one of the trusted devices 130. An empty or incomplete devicecertificate can be formed during the pre-programming stage 912. Acertificate agent 1114 can update the empty device certificate with theboard roots of trust and/or system identification 814 after it iscreated during the board manufacturing stage 914.

In another example, the incoming root of trust 504 can be combined withthe component root of trust 1104 in the pre-programming stage 912 touniquely identify the trusted devices 130. The component root of trust1104 is a root of trust associated with one of the programmable devices128. Each of the programmable devices 128 can have an individualcomponent root of trust 1104. The component root of trust 1104 can becalculated using the device birth certificate 520 for each of thecomponents.

The component root of trust 1104 can be a combination of the ID tokens624 of FIG. 6, the manufacturing markers 510 of FIG. 5, the incomingroot of trust 504 of FIG. 5, and other security values. The componentroot of trust 1104 can be recorded and received by an OEM manufacturingexecution system 1108 (OEM MES). The OEM MES 1108 can manage themanufacturing environment including capturing and managing manufacturingdata including the installation information about the programmabledevices 128 on the boards. The OEM MES 1108 can coordinate thecalculation of the board root of trust 1106 for each of the boards beingmanufactured and transfer the board root of trust 1106 to the boards ofthe trusted devices 130 or back to the OEM MES 1108. The calculation ofthe board root of trust 1108 can be performed at board manufacture timeand before the functional testing of the boards during the boardmanufacturing stage 914.

The trusted device 130 can receive the device birth certificate 520having the system identification 814 and the device identification 302during the board manufacturing stage 914. As part of the boardmanufacturing stage 914, the system can perform an after security testto validate the certificate agent 1114.

The system level root of trust can be kept in the OEM MES 1108 orembedded in the trusted devices 130. The certificate agent 1114 canupdate a dummy certificate having component information in it that hasnot been finalized to include the board root of trust 1106.

FIG. 12 illustrates an example of a secure programming process flow1202. The secure programming process flow can write security informationto the trusted devices 130 of FIG. 1 during a security and datapre-programming stage 1204. The sequence of stages includes the silicondesign stage 904, the silicon manufacturing stage 906, the board designphase 908, the security and data pre-programming stage 1204, the boardmanufacturing stage 914, the device provisioning stage 916, and thedevice operation stage 918.

The secure programming system 100 of FIG. 1 can program the trusteddevices 130 with the target payload 914. The target payload 914 caninclude encrypted or unencrypted data, firmware, and applications in asecure manner using the secure programmer 1206. The secure programmer1206 can embed encrypted or unencrypted data such as firmware, operatingsystem, data, application, updates, etc. In addition, the secureprogrammer can install the security roots of trust in the trusteddevices 130. This can include both data and code. The data can includekeys, certificate, passwords, PIN numbers, and other similar securitydata elements. The code can include security boot loaders, securitycode, and other similar active code elements.

The secure programming system 100 can combine the programming of codeand data using the secure programmer 1206. This can reduce costs forhigh volume production of devices.

The secure programmer 1206 can be enhanced with security featuresincluding having the identification module 316, the authenticationmodule 320, the cryptography module 318 and the code signing module 322.The security modules can execute in the secure execution unit 324 andaccess the secure storage unit 326. Additionally, the trusted devices130 may also access the secure modules. In order to program thefoundational roots of trust into component devices, the programmer 112of FIG. 1 must be a trusted device. It must embody the foundationalroots of trust in the design and architecture of the programmer 112.

FIG. 13 illustrates an example of the device birth certificate 520. Thedevice birth certificate 520 is a set of secure data parameters that areembedded in each of the programmable devices 128 that form a systemdevice at manufacture time. The device birth certificate 520 can includeinformation on the entities and locations where the programmable devices128 of FIG. 1 were manufactured to provide a way to authenticate theprogrammable devices 128.

The device birth certificate 520 can include a variety of information.The device birth certificate 520 can include the manufacturing markers510, incoming roots of trust markers 504, the serial number markers 512,the software markers 1306, the OEM markers 516, the system test markers1308, the operating markers 514, physically unclonable functions 1310(PUF), the security keys 106, the product markers 508, a job packageidentification 1304, location identification, facility information,programming center information, or other similar security values. Thedevice birth certificate 520 can include the device identification 302of FIG. 3 and extends the information by including additionalinformation about each step in the manufacturing process such ascomponent manufacture, programming configuration, programming location,job package information, and other related properties.

The physically unclonable functions 1310 are physical entities embodiedin a physical structure that is easy to evaluate but hard to predict.The physically unclonable functions 1310 are physical features in one ofthe programmable devices 128 that can be added during manufacturingprocess, but are difficult to duplicate. This can be considered thehardware equivalent of a one-way function.

The device birth certificate 520 or components of the device birthcertificate 520 may be stored in secure non-volatile memory areas of theprogrammable devices 128 with a variety of features. Each of the securenon-volatile memory areas may provide varying degrees of security. Forexample, the features may include one-time programming (OTP) areas,device private OTP areas, hardware fuses, Read-Only Memory (ROM), writeprotected memory, cryptographically controlled memory access areas(e.g., Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB), etc.), etc. Also, forexample, these features may apply to the programmable devices 128.

FIG. 14 illustrates an example of the secure programming environment108. The secure programming environment 108 can include additionalsecurity elements to increase the level of security for the programmer112.

The secure programming environment 108 can have a variety ofconfigurations for performing different functions. For example, thesecure programming environment 108 can include the programmer 112, ahardware security module 1404, and a serial number server 1406. Thehardware security module 1404 can provide the programmer 112 withadditional security functionality such as encryption, decryption, andother similar functions. The hardware security module 1404 can generatethe security elements needed to embed the foundational roots of trust,such as the security keys, key pairs, or other similar elements. Thehardware security module 1404 can be used by the programmer 112 toexecute cryptographic and security code.

The serial number server 1406 can provide the programmer 112 with theserial numbers for the programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1. The serialnumber server 1406 can provide serial numbers in a variety of ways. Forexample, the serial number server 1406 can generate serial numbers,provide serial numbers from a feed, or a combination thereof. The serialnumbers can be distributed over a particular serial number range, becontiguous, noncontiguous, uniformly distributed, or based on amathematical formula.

The secure programming environment 108 can receive a job control package1418 from an OEM workstation 1412 associated with an OEM developmentlaboratory 1410. The job control package 1418 can be associated with atarget payload 1420 and other security and control to be programmed intothe programmable devices 128. The target payload 1420 can be encryptedto form an encrypted payload 1422 that can be transferred to theprogrammable devices 128.

The target payload 1420 is the information to be encrypted andprogrammed into the programmable devices 128. The target payload 1420can include data, code, security keys, and other information. Forexample, the target payload 1420 can be secure firmware code to beexecuted on the trusted devices 130. In another example, the targetpayload 1420 can include different data elements combined together, suchas a set of additional security keys and one or more software modules.

The job control package 1418 comprises the information needed toconfigure and program the programmable devices 128 with the targetpayload 1420. The job control package 1418 can include programminginstructions, security information, programmer configurationinformation, device configuration information, and other similar jobinformation.

The secure programming environment 108 can receive security informationfrom an OEM/CA public key infrastructure system 1414 having acertificate management backend 1416. The certificate management backend1416 can calculate the security keys and the individual devicecertificates for each of the programmable devices 128 to be programmed.

The programmer 112 can encrypt the target payload 1420 individually foreach of the programmable devices 128. For example, the certificatemanagement backend 1416 and the hardware security module 1408 canprovide individual security keys 106 of FIG. 1 for each of theprogrammable devices 128. In another example, the programmer 112 cancombine the security keys 106 with the individual serial numbersprovided by the serial number server 1406 to generate the encryptedpayload 1422. The programmer 112 can then transfer the encrypted payload1422 to the specific one of the trusted devices 130 mounted in thedevice adapters 208 of FIG. 2 and individually customize each of theprogrammable devices 128.

In another embodiment, the security provisioning of devices can beperformed by embedding the roots of trust in the programmable devices128. The key pairs 150 of FIG. 1 are generated in the hardware securitymodule 1408 and then the private keys 152 of FIG. 1 can be programmedinto the programmable devices 128 without being exposed outside of thesecure programmable environment 108. The public keys 154 of FIG. 1 ofthe key pairs 150 are transformed into certificates in the hardwaresecurity module 1404. The certificates can then be programmed into theprogrammable devices 128. The public keys 154 for each of the key pairs150 can also be extracted and put into an OEM key management system backend server infrastructure, such as the certificate management backend1416.

In an illustrative example, the secure programming system 100 of FIG. 1can program encrypted firmware into the programmable devices 128 wherethe encrypted firmware has been encrypted using a symmetric key K1. Theencrypted firmware can be an encrypted payload 1422. The firmware can becode such as boot loaders, applications, operating system elements, orother code elements. There are two variants on how the problem issolved.

In the first variant, the encrypted firmware can be programmed intoprogrammable device and then decrypted on one of the programmabledevices 128 using the symmetric key K1. This requires that encryptedfirmware image and the symmetric key K1 are programmed into theprogrammable devices without being exposed. A programming job, such asthe job control package 1418, can be created from the encrypted firmwareimage and then programmed into one of the programmable devices 128. Thesymmetric key K1 can then be securely injected first into the hardwaresecurity module 1404. The programmer 112 and hardware security module1404 can authenticate each other using the symmetric key K1 and create ashared secret key, such as a session key 1424, that is used to encryptthe symmetric key K1 in the hardware security module 1404 and send it tothe programmer 112. The programmer 112 can use the session key 1424 todecrypt the encrypted symmetric key K1 and then program symmetric key K1into one of the programmable devices 128. This is the most securemethodology. Because the session keys 1424 are dynamic in nature, theprogrammer 112 knows a priori what the encryption key is.

In a second variant, if the programmable devices 128 lacksencryption/decryption capability, the decryption of the firmware imagecan be done on the programmer 112 and then the firmware image can beprogramming into one of the programmable devices 128 by the programmer112.

The secure programming environment 108 and the programmer 112 can beintegrated with the hardware security module 1404 to enable secure keyand certificate programming, as well as security kernel programming.

The secure programming environment 108 can enhance job control and jobrunning to protect data and firmware intellectual property. The secureprogramming environment 108 can support data and firmware integrity suchthat intellectual property cannot be changed in transit to devices. Thesecure programming environment can support data and firmwareconfidentiality such that the intellectual property cannot be stolen andreverse engineered. Unauthorized entities cannot access the securecontent.

The secure programming environment 108 can utilize an Enhancedprogrammer architecture. The programmer 112 can cryptographicallyidentify and authenticate itself (PKI citizen) to other systemsaccessible on the secure network. The programmer 112 can securely bootitself. The programmer 112 can securely decrypt the firmware and dataelements without exposure of the data or the security keys. Finally, theprogrammer 112 can read device serial numbers and cryptographicallyauthenticate devices.

The programmer 112 can program security kernels, program keys, locallygenerated read keys, program data and firmware, and other securityelements. The programmer 112 can operate in a secure premise havingsufficient physical and access security to detect or prevent externalaccess and tampering.

The secure programming environment 108 can support and interface to themanufacturing execution system 1408 to record per device information,such as serial numbers, public keys, public certificates, per deviceprogramming data, and job control information. The MES 1408 can besecured to prevent unauthorized access and to protect the secure data.

FIG. 15 illustrates an example of a manufacturing flow with securityalgorithms 1502. The manufacturing flow with security algorithms 1502provides a simplified method of manufacturing the trusted devices 130.

The secure programming system 100 of FIG. 1 can program a variety of theprogrammable devices 128 of FIG. 1. For example, the programmabledevices 128 can be flash memory devices, FPGA devices, hardware securitymodules, smart phones, consumer devices, or similar electronic productsthat have a need for security. Because each of the device types canrequire different operations to program it, the secure programmingsystem 100 can implement a system of security algorithms 1504 to providea uniform programming interface to simplify device programming.

The security algorithms 1504 can be used at each interface between thesystem and the trusted devices 130. For example, the security algorithms1504 can receive the root of trust code 620 and the root of trust data622 from the identification module 316, the authentication module 320,the cryptography module 318 or the code signing module 322. Each of thesecurity algorithms 1504 can be used to provide a uniform interface toaccess the security features of the particular type of the trusteddevices 130 being programmed. The security algorithms 1504 can provide auniform interface with the secure execution unit 324 and the securestorage unit 326 for each of the modules.

The security algorithms 1504 can be used to embed the roots of trustinto the trusted device 130. The security algorithms 1504 can becustomized for each device type and can store code and data for eachroot of trust in the secure storage unit 326. The security algorithms1504 can configure the data and code to run in the secure execution unit324 and utilize the secure execution features of one of the trusteddevices 130.

The security algorithms 1504 can expose a standardized programminginterface for access by the device firmware. The security algorithms1504 simplify security programming by abstracting away the complexity ofmapping the key security use cases to a system. This simplifiesembedding the uses cases into the devices.

In another example, the security algorithms 1504 can be used to implantdifferent roots of trust in the secure storage unit 326. Theprogrammable devices 128, such as flash memory units, can requirespecialized actions to write the data into the secure storage unit 326.The specialized action can include identifying a private block ofmemory, activating a security fuse, using write only memory, or similaractions.

FIG. 16 illustrates an example of a secure boot use case 1602. Thesecure boot use case 1602 can describe the process for booting one ofthe trusted device 130 in a secure manner using only authenticated bootcode. In addition, the secure boot use case 1602 can be used forperforming an over the air firmware update, install over the airapplications, and peripheral authentication.

Before loading code on to one of the trusted devices 130, it must beauthenticated that the code came from a trusted party 1603 and that thecode has not been tampered with. Encrypted items, such as softwareitems, can be signed with a signature key to authenticate the source.For example, an item encrypted using the private key of the key pair canbe authenticated using the public key.

The code can include a first stage boot loader 1610, a second stage bootloader 1616, an operating system 1618, firmware, applications, or othersimilar code elements. Each of the code elements can include a signatureand a cryptographic key for authentication.

The first stage boot loader 1610 can authenticate the second stage bootloader 1616 by sending a cryptographic key 1614 to the second stage bootloader 1616 and receiving a signature 1612 back. The second stage bootloader 1616 can authenticate the first stage boot loader 1610 if thesignature 1612 and the cryptographic key 1614 are correct.

The second stage boot loader 1616 can authenticate the operating system1618 by sending a cryptographic key 1630 to the operating system 1618and receiving a signature 1628 back. The second stage boot loader 1616can authenticate the operating system 1618 if the signature 1628 and thecryptographic key 1630 are correct.

The operating system 1618 can validate applications before execution bypassing a cryptographic key 1634 to the applications and getting asignature 1632 back. The operating system can authenticate theapplications, if the signature 1632 and the cryptographic key 1634 arecorrect. The applications can include a first application 1620, a secondapplication 1622, a third application 1624, and a nth application 1626.

The first stage boot loader 1610 is programmed into one of the trusteddevice 130 at manufacture time. The second stage boot loader 1616, theoperating system 1618, and the applications can be received in a varietyof ways. For example, they can be received at manufacture time, from thecloud 1604, as an over the air download 1606, from a removable securedigital card 1608, or a combination thereof.

An authentication key can be used to authenticate with the peripheralmedium on which the update is stored. By authenticating a securityelement with the authentication key, the system can insure that thecontent has been provided by the owner of the authentication key. Asignature key can also be used to guarantee the authenticity of theparty that released the software update, such as an OEM. The signaturekey can also be used to verify that the software update has not beenmodified in transit.

FIG. 17 illustrates an example of a device provisioning use case 1702.The device provisioning use case 1702 can show the process for deployingnew code and data to one of the trusted devices 130 by an originalequipment manufacturer, a network operator, or a telecommunicationscarrier.

During the operational stage of the device lifecycle for theprogrammable devices 128 of FIG. 1, a provisioning agent 1704 can beactivated on one of the trusted devices 130. The provisioning agent 1704can securely receive updated code and data and installed them within thetrusted device 130.

The provisioning agent 1704 can validate and authenticate the incomingcode and data to ensure that the provisioning operation is allowed. Theprovisioning agent 1704 can access the device birth certificate 520 ofFIG. 5 and verify that the embedded values of the incoming code and dataare consistent with the values in use. The incoming code and data can betagged with the correct security elements for the targeted one of thetrusted devices 130.

The provisioning process can be initiated automatically by an authorizedservice provider such as the OEM, the network operations, or thetelecommunications carrier. Alternatively, the provisioning process canbe initiated manually by a provisioning user 1706.

The device birth certificate 520 can include the incoming root of trust504, the serial number markers 512, the firmware markers 506, themanufacturing markers 510, the product markers 508, the operatingmarkers 514, the OEM markers 516, the key pairs 150 of FIG. 1, usermarkers 1708, or other similar security elements. The provisioning agent1704 can execute on the trusted device 130 having the secure executionunit 324 and the secure storage unit 326. For example, the user markerscan include user information such as name, address, email, phone,carrier plan, or other similar user information elements.

The provisioning agent 1704 can be software or firmware executing withthe secure execution unit 324 and using data from the secure storageunit 326. The provisioning agent 1704 can include internal checksums ormarkers that can be calculated by a code signing module and used toauthenticate code of the provisioning agent 1704. The code of theprovisioning agent 1704 can be checked at manufacture or provisioningtime or can be checked by another module within the one of the trusteddevices 130.

In an illustrative example, the provisioning agent 1704 can be used toprovision the user information on one of the trusted devices 130. Theprovisioning agent 1704 may add the user related metadata to a devicebirth certificate by extending it to include the user data during theactive phase, such as when a new user is introduced. The provisioningagent 1704 allows secure updates of the security metadata of one of thetrusted devices 130.

FIG. 18 illustrates an example of a tamper detection use case 1802. Thetamper detection use case 1802 describes the detection of unauthorizedchanges in code or data in the programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1.

During the operational stage of the device lifecycle for theprogrammable devices 128, a monitoring agent 1804 can be activated onone of the programmable devices 128. The monitoring agent 1804 canaccess the device birth certificate 520 of FIG. 5 and verify that theembedded values are consistent with the values in use.

The device birth certificate 520 can include the incoming root of trust504, the serial number markers 512, the firmware markers 506, themanufacturing markers 510, the product markers 508, the operatingmarkers 514, the OEM markers 516, key pairs 150, or other similarsecurity elements. The monitoring agent 1804 can execute on the trusteddevice 130 having the secure execution unit 324 and the secure storageunit 326.

The monitoring agent 1804 can be software or firmware executing with thesecure execution unit 324 and using data from the secure storage unit326. The monitoring agent 1804 can include an internal checksum ormarker that can be calculated by a code signing module and used toauthenticate code of the monitoring agent 1804. The code of themonitoring agent 1804 can be checked at manufacture or provisioning timeor can be checked by another module within the one of the trusteddevices 130.

In an illustrative example, the monitoring agent 1804 can check theserial number markers 512 against the available serial number of one ofthe programmable devices, such as a trusted smart device. If the twovalues do not match, then the monitoring agent 1804 can detect thechange and initiate the appropriate security action 1806. The securityaction 1806 can include stopping operation, sending a security message,displaying a security message, providing an error message, quarantiningthe device, or a combination thereof.

In another example, the monitoring agent 1804 can check the firmwaremarkers 506 against the currently available firmware within the trustedsmart device. If the values do not match, then the currently availablefirmware can be deleted and a new version requested to correct theproblem.

FIG. 19 illustrates an example of an internet of things use case 1902.The internet of things use case can describe the flow of secureinformation for deployed IoT device, such as the trusted devices 130 ofFIG. 1.

The IoT devices 1912 can communicate with the internet 1908 via agateway 1910. A remote system 1904 can exchange data and analysisinformation via the internet 1908 to an analytics data storage unit1906.

Each of the IoT devices 1912 can have the device identification 302 ofFIG. 3. Each of the IoT devices 1912 can be serialized and have separateand unique values for the device identification 302.

The system can protect communication between devices and between devicesand peripherals. This can be accomplished by building trust betweendevices using device authentication. Additionally, the confidentialityof data transfer can be increased by using data encryption anddecryption to protect the data in transit.

The system can implement device hardening to protect devices fromattack. This can be done by limiting the execution of code on thedevices to authorized code for both firmware and application code. Thiscan be done using secure boot protocols, code signing, and other similartechniques. In addition, the devices can implement runtime protection tohelp prevent code and data interception attacks using applicationsandboxing and virtualization. For example, the system can utilizesecure execution modules and secure storage modules such as the ARMTrustZone® or similar systems.

Secure device management can be implementing using secure over the airupdate of firmware and software during provisioning in the operationalportion of the device lifecycle. This can provide additional protectionfor code and data updates transferred over less secure channels.

Finally, the overall system security is enhanced by leveraging Internetof Things analytics to flag anomalies. For example, big data analysiscan be provided by the analytics and data storage module 1906 toevaluate and detect unusual network and data events related to potentialsecurity threats.

In an illustrative example, the system can send a shutdown command toall of the IoT devices 1912 that are shown to be compromised. In anotherexample, the remote system 1904 can send the request for information tosome of the IoT devices 1912 to gather additional information needed toevaluate a security threat.

FIG. 20 illustrates an example of a security and data programming usecase 2002. The security and data programming use case 2002 can includeperforming security and data programming on a microcontroller unit(MCU).

The security portion of the security and data programming use case 2002can include programming blank devices, installing a security kernel,provisioning the device keys, installing device certificates 2014,locking a device and enabling secure storage and secure execution, or acombination thereof. The device certificates 2014 can include anidentification, a public signing key, a public encryption key, or othersimilar elements.

The data and firmware portion of the security and data programming usecase 2002 can include programming an encrypted firmware image,decryption of secured content on the device, or a combination thereof.This can also include encrypting the target payload 1420 of FIG. 14 toform the encrypted payload 1422 of FIG. 14, decrypting the encryptedpayload 1422, decrypting signatures for validation, calculating andcomparing hash values, or other similar actions.

In a device personalization example, the device certificate 2014 canhave a data encryption public key 2008 extracted from a data encryptionkey pair. Any other system or device that wants to send encrypted datato the trusted devices 130 of FIG. 1 can use the data encryption publickey 2008 to encrypt the data. The private key 152 of FIG. 1 can beprogrammed into a hidden area on the device, such as in a non-volatilememory area. The private key 152 can be used to decrypt the encrypteddata.

The device certificate 2014 can also include a public device signing key2006 extracted from a device signing key pair. Any data that will leavethis device will be signed by the private key of the device signing keypair. The public key portion of the device signing key pair can be usedby the receiver to authenticate that the message came from the signer.

The overall problem is to create these key pairs and the devicecertificate 2014 with these keys. The private keys and the devicecertificate with the public keys will both be programmed into thedevice. In addition, any device that wants to communicate data with aparticular device will need to get access to its device certificatebefore exchanging data securely.

The device certificate 2014 must be signed by a certificate authority.The certificate authority is an entity that certifies that theinformation in the certificate is correct. This is donecryptographically by the private key of the FAB key pair. The FAB keypair represent a third party where microcontroller unit silicon isfabricated. The public key of the FAB key pair is put into a FABcertificate which is then signed by the private key of a root key pair.The FAB certificate is a separate data certificate used to hold the FABkey pair. A root key 2010 can represent the initial security key of thesilicon vendor for the microcontroller unit. The public key of thesilicon vendor key is available publicly and can be retrieved as needed.In this example, the programming of the device certificate isanticipated to be performed in the FAB factory.

Both the device certificate 2014 and the FAB certificate are programmedinto the trusted devices 130 to ensure the trust chain between thesilicon vendor and the trusted devices 130 can be established by anyagent who wants to verify the authenticity of the trusted devices 130starting with the public key of the silicon vendor. If the public key ofthe silicon vendor is known, then the FAB Certificate can be validatedto get the public key of the FAB key 2012. Using the public key of theFAB key 2012, the Device Certificate 2014 can be validated and used toget the Public Keys of the Device Certificate 2014.

A device seed 2004 can be a unique value associated with one of theprogrammable devices 128 of FIG. 1. For example, the device seed 2004can be a device level root of trust, a serial number, a security key, arandom number, or similar unique security values.

FIG. 21 illustrates an example of an off device seed use case 2102. Theoff device seed use case 2102 can be performed in a hardware securitymodule at a programming center.

In the off device seed use case 2102, the security elements can beinstantiated and managed between several locations. The locations caninclude a variety of configurations. For example, the first location2104 can be a silicon manufacturer. A second location 2106 can be anoriginal equipment manufacturer (OEM) location. The third location 2108can be the device manufacturing or provisioning location. The thirdlocation 2108 can be a programming center where the programmer 112 ofFIG. 1 and the programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1 are located. The thirdlocation 2108 can include 24-hour video surveillance of both theprogrammer 112 and the programmable devices 128 to prevent anytampering. The programmable device 128 can include security appliances,chips, memory devices, boards, or a combination thereof.

In a step 2110, the blank programmable devices 128 and the referenceboot loader software can be provided by the microcontroller unit siliconvendor and be physically transported to the second location 2106 forfurther processing. The physical transport is a secure physicaltransport to prevent unauthorized access to the blank programmabledevices 128 and the security software.

In a step 2112, the programmable devices 128 can be received at thesecond location 2106, such as an OEM. The OEM can develop the securitykernel and/or a security boot loader by modifying the reference bootloader software. The OEM can also develop and provide the encryptedfirmware image and the firmware encryption key (UPK). The OEM can alsoprovide a total count of the devices that need to be produced. Thisinformation is kept in a first hardware security module (HSM #1)appliance at the OEM and can be provided to the programming center viaencrypted transport into an on premise second hardware security modulesecurity appliance (HSM #2).

In a step 2114, the security appliance in the second hardware securitymodule can generate all the signed device certificates and FABcertificates for each of the programmable devices 128 using random seedsgenerated in the second hardware security module. The HSM #2 securityappliance can merge the seed, certificate, and secure kernel for eachdevice as a programmable payload P. The security information can betransferred to the programmer 112 using an encrypted transport using theprogrammer certificate.

In a step 2116, the programmer 112 can program the trusted devices 128with the programmable payload P and then lock the device from anymodification of the programmable payload. The private keys of the keypairs do not need to be programmed into the device because the devicecan use the seed to generate the private keys on demand at any time onthe device. This generation of the private key is part of the securitykernel and can only be securely accessed through security kernel. In astep 2118, one of the programmable devices 128 can be programmed withthe security kernel.

In a step 2120, the programmer 112 can issue a reboot command tovalidate that the device and security kernel are alive and then returnwith the device certificate. In a step 2124, the security appliance usesthe public data encryption key from the device certificate of the deviceto generate the device specific super encrypted UPK. The super encryptedkey and the encrypted firmware image can then be sent back to theprogrammer 112 for programming into one of the programmable devices 128.

In a step 2126, the encrypted file can be programmed into one of theprogrammable devices 128. The encrypted file can be transferred to oneof the programmable devices 128 as an encrypted file.

In a step 2128, the programmer 112 can transfer the encrypted file toone of the programmable devices 128 where the image is decrypted andinstalled in one of the programmable devices 128. The installation ofthe image is qualified and verified by sending back the certificate andthe module list to the programmer 112.

In a step 2130, the programmer 112 can verify the installation of theencrypted file on the programmable devices by matching the certificateand module list to a list of known certificates and modules.

Generating the device seed in the second hardware security module at theprogramming center increases the overall level of manufacturing securityby reducing the number of opportunities for leaking the securityelements. Because the programming center is a controlled environmentwith 24-hour a day video surveillance, the programmable devices 128 canbe programmed with a higher degree of security and integrity.

FIG. 22 illustrates an example of an on device see use case 2202. The ondevice seed use case 2202 can be performed in a hardware security moduleat an original equipment manufacturer location.

In the on device seed use case 2202, the security elements can beinstantiated and managed between several locations. The locations caninclude a variety of configurations. The locations can include a siliconmanufacturer 2204, an original equipment manufacturer 2206, aprogramming center 2208, a manufacturing center, or similar location.Further, the use case can include data and actions embedded at theprogrammer 112 level and the device level 2212.

In a step 2222, the blank programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1 and thereference boot loader software can be provided to the microcontrollerunit silicon vendor and physically transported to the second location,such as the OEM 2206, for further processing. The physical transport isa secure physical transport to prevent unauthorized access to the blankprogrammable devices 128 and the security software.

In a step 2224, the programmable devices 128 can be received at thesecond location, such as an OEM. The OEM can develop the security kerneland a security boot loader by modifying the reference boot loadersoftware. The OEM can also develop and provide the encrypted firmwareimage and the firmware encryption key (UPK). The OEM can also provide atotal count of the devices that need to be produced. The security kerneland the seed kernel can be kept in a first hardware security module (HSM#1) appliance at the OEM and can be provided to the programming centervia encrypted transport into an on premise second hardware securitymodule security appliance (HSM #2).

In a step 2226, the second hardware security module of a securityappliance can send the seed kernel to the programmer 112 of FIG. 1. Theseed is generated on the HSM#2 of the device. The seed kernel needs tobe programmed into the device which will execute on device to generatethe seed and key pairs. The public key will go into the devicecertificates and private key can be programmed into the devices.

Step 2226 can send the seed kernel to the programmer 112 which willprogram the seed kernel into the device. The device is then re-bootedand the seed kernel is executed. They seed kernel can then generate thekey pairs. The private keys are stored in hidden memory area on thedevice. The public keys (Kpub) are returned back to the HSM #2. TheHSM#2 can also generate signed certificates, merge them with thesecurity kernel, and program it into the device.

This use case is the most secure use case because the device secret, theseed kernel, and the subsequent private keys are generated in the HSM#2and are never exposed outside the device. The public keys can be sendand exposed outside the device. Thus, the data exchange between theprogrammer 112 and the device is secure and minimizes securityvulnerabilities even though some data is exchanged in the clear. This isdifferent from the off device seed use case 2102 of FIG. 21 where thesecurity kernel and seed programming are transferred between theprogrammer and device in clear. This can potentially be a securitybreach if the data is intercepted and requires stricter premise securityrequirements.

In a step 2228, the programmer 112 can program the trusted devices 128with the programmable payload P and then lock the device from anymodification of the programmable payload. The private keys of the keypairs do not need to be programmed into the device because the devicecan use the seed to generate the private keys on demand at any time onthe device. This generation of the private key is part of the securitykernel and can only be securely accessed through security kernel.

In a step 2230, one of the programmable devices 128 can be programmedwith the seed kernel. After the seed kernel has be installed, the step2228 can continue and the programmer can issue a reboot command to thedevice.

In step 2232, the device can generate the device seed and security keys106 of FIG. 1 and then generate and send the public key to theprogramming center level, such as the MES. The public key can be sent inthe clear because the public key can be shared and is not a hiddenvalue.

In a step 2234, the system can generate and sign the device certificate.Then the secure kernel can be merged with the device certificate andsent to the programmer 112. The merged secure kernel is sent usingencrypted transport using the programmer certificate.

In a step 2236, the programmer 112 can receive the secure kernel andprovision one of the programmable devices 128 with the secure kernel.The secure kernel can be sent to one of the programmable devices 128using an encrypted transport channel using the public key.

In a step 2238, the device can decrypt and install the secure kernel. Inaddition, the signature can be added to the device. After the securekernel has been installed, step 2236 can sent a reboot command to thedevice and the device can return the certificate in a step 2240.

In a step 2242, the security appliance uses the public data encryptionkey from the device certificate of the device to generate the devicespecific super encrypted UPK. The super encrypted key and the encryptedfirmware image can then be sent back to the programmer 112 forprogramming into one of the programmable devices 128.

In a step 2244, the encrypted file can be programmed into one of theprogrammable devices 128. The encrypted file can be transferred to oneof the programmable devices 128 as an encrypted file using the publickey.

In a step 2246, the programmer 112 can transfer the encrypted file toone of the programmable devices 128 where the image is decrypted andinstalled in one of the programmable devices 128. The installation ofthe image is qualified and verified by sending back the certificate andthe module list to the programmer 112.

In a step 2248, the programmer 112 can verify the installation of theencrypted file on the programmable devices by matching the certificateand module list to a list of known certificates and modules.

Generating the device seed in the second hardware security module at theprogramming center increases the overall level of manufacturing securityby reducing the number of opportunities for leaking the securityelements. Because the programming center is a controlled environmentwith 24-hour a day video surveillance, the programmable devices 128 canbe programmed with a higher degree of security and integrity.

FIG. 23 illustrates an example of a managed and security processingsystem 2302 (MSP system). The MSP system 2302 can securely deploy andprovision the programmable devices 128.

The MSP system 2302 can individually configure data devices and trusteddevices with cryptographic information to provide a secure programmingand operation environment. The MSP system 2302 can allow the secureprogramming of the programmable devices 128 at a secure location, suchas a contract manufacturer, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)site, or other similar location.

The MSP system 2302 can be one of the embodiments of the secureprogramming system 100 of FIG. 1. The elements of the MSP system 2302can be implemented using the element of the secure programming system100.

The MSP system 2302 can support the operation of the system distributedin part across multiple locations or premises. The MSP system 2302 caninclude an OEM development premise 2340 and a factory premise 2342. TheOEM development premise 2340 can be used to prepare for the actualprogramming and provisioning of the programmable devices 128. The OEMdevelopment premise 2340 can be used to prepare programming informationfor multiple factories. The OEM development premise 2340 is a locationwhere an OEM can prepare a programming project 2344 having theinformation for configuring a set of secure devices, such as theprogrammable devices 128, secure elements, trusted devices 130 of FIG.1, or other similar devices.

Although there are differences between the different types of securedevices, the terms are generally understood to be interchangeable andare general in nature. The secure devices, secure elements, programmabledevices 128, trusted devices 130, and other similar elements can be usedinterchangeably in this description for convenience and brevity.

The OEM development premise 2340 can take firmware images 2314 that areused to provision the programmable devices 128 and prepare theprogramming project 2344. The programming project 2344 can then besecurely transferred to the factory premise 2342 and used to control theprogramming of the programmable devices 128.

The OEM development premise 2340 can have a set of secure manufacturingsystems and data stores for facilitating creating the programmingproject 2344. For example, the OEM development premise 2340 can includeOEM certificate key material 2304, an OEM Security boot loader 2306, theOEM firmware development system 2308, an OEM mastering tool 2310, aFirmware Update Service 2312, and an OEM Management system 2324.

The factory premise 2342 is a location for programming and provisioningthe programmable devices 128. The factory premise 2342 can be aprogramming center, a fabrication facility, a contract manufacturersite, or a similar location. In an embodiment, the factory premise 2342is where the programmer 112 and the programmable devices 128 are locateand operated.

The MSP system 2302 can include a security boot loader 2318. Thesecurity boot loader 2318 is the secure programming code that can beexecuted at boot time on the programmable devices 128 to insurecompliance with the security protocols. The OEM security boot loader2306 creates device identity, creates the ability to accept an encrypteddata stream and de-crypt on device and initializes a secure run timeenvironment on the device so that firmware can run securely on thedevice.

The MSP system 2302 can also include secure firmware 2320. The securefirmware 2320 is software code and data to be embedded in non-volatilememory of the programmable devices 128. The secure firmware 2320 can betransferred in an encrypted state and decrypted at the programmer 112.

The MSP system 2302 can include a firmware decrypt key 2322. Thefirmware decrypt key 2322 can be used to decrypt the secure firmware2320 that has been encrypted using the encryption key related to thefirmware decrypt key 2322. For example, the firmware decrypt key and theencryption key can be part of a symmetric key pair used for encryption.

The MSP system 2302 can include firmware images 2314 from the OEM: Thefirmware images 2314 are embedded application code that will be loadedby OEM security boot loader 2306 and run on the programmable devices 128during and after manufacturing.

The MSP system 2302 can include the OEM certificate key material 2304:The OEM certificate key material 2304 can include information such as asilicon vendor device authentication key 2355, an OEM device certificatesignature key 2347 used to sign an OEM device certificate 2346, and anOEM device certificate template 2350. For example, the silicon vendordevice authentication key 2355 can be an authentication key used toauthenticate content from the silicon vendor. The OEM device certificatesignature key 2347 can be a signature key used to sign content tosecurely identify the OEM. The signature key can be linked to averification key to verify the signature. In another example, thesignature key and the verification key can be a public and private keyof an authentication key pair.

The OEM device certificate template 2350 is a block of information usedto form the OEM certificate 2351. It includes the basic requiredinformation for the OEM certificate 2351. The OEM certificate 2351 is ablock of information that defines an OEM user 2368. The OEM certificate2351 can include an OEM identifier 2366, an OEM public key 2362 and anOEM private key 2352. The OEM identifier 2366 is a value that uniquelyidentifies the OEM.

A silicon vendor is an entity that can manufacture or provide theprogrammable devices 128. The silicon vendor can be identified with asilicon vendor identifier 2356. The silicon vendor identifier 2356 is avalue linked to the silicon vendor. For example, the silicon vendoridentifier 2356 can be linked to the company that actually makes theintegrated circuits or components that form the programmable devices128. The silicon vendor can also be a company that pre-configures theprogrammable devices 128 before delivering them for programming by thesystem.

The MSP system 2302 can include a OEM firmware development system 2308.The firmware development system 2308 supports the development offirmware images 2314 for deployment to the programmable devices 128.

The MSP system 2302 can include the OEM Mastering Tool 2310 (OMT): TheOEM mastering tool 2310 is a security application or system that canbind the OEM security boot loader 2306 to the firmware images 2314. TheOEM mastering tool 2310 can sign and encrypt the firmware images 2314and prepare the firmware images 2314 for field updates. The fieldupgrades can allow the firmware deployed in the programmable devices 128to be changed remotely in a secure fashion. The OEM mastering tool 2310can product the secure firmware 2320 by encrypting the firmware images2314 using the firmware decrypt key 2322. The OEM mastering tool 2310can include a HSM or TSM and be implemented in hardware or software.

The MSP system 2302 can include an OEM management system 2324. The OEMmanagement system 2324 is a system for defining the programming project2344 for an OEM user. The programming project 2344 is an informationpackage that defines a secure production run of the programmable devices128.

The OEM management system 2324 can bind the OEM Security Boot Loader2306, the firmware images 2314, the OEM certificate 2351, the OEMcertificate key materials 2304, and a production count 2348 to theprogramming project 2344. Once the programming project 2344 is initiallycreated, the programming project 2344 can updated to include thereferences, code, and data of the OEM security boot loader 2306, thefirmware images 2314, the OEM certificate key materials 2304, the OEMcertificate 2351, and the production count 2348. The binding processmeans that the information is part of the parameters of the programmingproject 2344. The OEM management system 2324 can also bind theprogramming project 2344 to a specific security programming system atthe factory premise 2342. The programming project 2344 can include thesystem identification 814 of FIG. 8 of a programming system or subsystemsuch as the secure programming system 100, the programming unit 110, theprogrammer 112, or a combination thereof. Then the programming project2344 can only be performed on a system having the system identification814.

The production count 2348 is an indicator describing the number ofsecure devices to be produced in the production run. The productioncount 2348 can be compared to an incrementing number that is updatedwhen a secure device begins or completes production. The programmer 112receiving the programming project 2344 can use the production count 2348to limit the number of devices programmed and provisioned to preventunauthorized production of the programmable devices 128. Duringproduction, a current count 2378 can indicate the current number of theproducts that have been produced. The system can stop programming thedevices by comparing the current count 2378 to the production count 2348and stopping when the current count 2378 is equal to the productioncount 2348.

The OEM management system 2324 can be configured in a variety of ways.For example, the OEM management system 2324 can be implemented in ashared configuration and generate the programming project 2344 fordeployment to multiple OEMs each having their own factory, such as thefactory premise 2342. The OEM management system 2324 can be implementedusing the secure master storage system 102 of FIG. 1, the securitymaster system 104 of FIG. 1, the secure programming system 100 of FIG.1, or a combination of systems and subsystems thereof.

The MSP system 2302 can include a factory management system 2330. Thefactory management system 2330 is a system for managing the secureprogramming components at the factory premise 2342. The factorymanagement system 2330 can receive the programming project 2344 from theOEM management system 2324 and the decrypt and distribute themanufacturing information to the other security and programming systemslocated at the factory premise 2342.

The factory management system 2330 can be implemented in a variety ofways. For example, the factory management system 2330 can be implementedwith the manufacturing execution system 702 of FIG. 7, the programmingprocessor 202 of FIG. 2, the host computer system, or another similarprocessing system.

The MSP system 2302 can include a factory security system 2332. Thefactory security system is an HSM based security appliance thatgenerates keys and certificates to be programmed into the programmabledevices 128. The factory security system 2332 can support a multi-tenantOEM architecture by isolating the security information of one OEM fromthat of another. This allows the factory security system 2332 to programand provision different sets of the programmable devices 128 fordifferent OEMs in different programmers.

The factory security system 2332 can be configured in a variety of ways.For example, the factory security system 2332 can be implemented usingthe security master system 104 of FIG. 1, the security controller 114 ofFIG. 1, the programming processor 202 of FIG. 2, the first securitymodule 116 of FIG. 1, the second security module 118 of FIG. 1, the nthsecurity module 120 of FIG. 1, or a combination thereof. The factorysecurity system 2332 can be implemented in a centralized or distributedfashion using one or multiple security components in the MSP system2302.

The factory security system 2332 can provide high security encryptionservices including key pair generation, encryption, decryption,certificate management, secure storage, secure execution, and othersimilar security processing features. The factory security system 2332can also support secure development, secure mastering, secure deploymentof data and code, secure provisioning, secure programming, and secureupdates.

The factory security system 2332 can perform device authentication basedon device certificates, deployment management and versioning, digitallifecycle management, and application management. The factory securitysystem 2332 can provide symmetric encryption, hash functions, dataencapsulation, digital signatures, key agreement and transport, keymanagement, and user access control.

The factory security system 2332 can include a factory security systemcertificate 2333 for authenticating the identity of the factory securitysystem 2332. The factory security system certificate 2333 can be used tosign information transferred from the OEM development premise 2340 andthe OEM management system 2324 to the factory management system 2330 andthe factory security system 2332. The factory security system 2332 caninclude a factory security data encryption key 2380 and a factorysecurity data authentication key 2382. The keys can be used to securelyencrypt, decrypt, sign, and authenticate secure information.

The MSP system 2302 can include a host system 2336 at the factorypremise 2342. The host system 2336 is a computer system for controllingthe execution of the programming project 2344 and managing thecommunication between the programmer 112 and Factory security system2332.

The host system 2336 can be implemented in a variety of ways. Forexample, the host system 2336 can be implemented using the securitycontroller 114, the programming processor 202, or another similarcomputing system coupled to the secure programming system 100. The hostsystem 2336 can be coupled to the factory security system 2332, theprogrammer 112, the factory management system 2330, or other similarsystems.

The MSP system 2302 can include the programmer 112 for programming theprogrammable devices 128. The programmer 112 can receive a set of blankor partially programmed devices and securely program the programmabledevices 128 with the information from the programming project 2344.

The programmer 112 can create serial data lists 2364 for programming theprogrammable devices 128. The serial data lists 2364 are lists of devicespecific data to be programmed into the programmable devices 128. Thiscan include the firmware images 2314, the OEM device certificate 2346,code, data, or other information. The serial data lists 2364 can varybased on the individual device information, such as serial numbers,device identification, data certificates, or similar device specificparameters.

The MSP system 2302 can include device certificates to protect theprogrammable devices 128. The device certificates can include siliconvendor device certificates 2326, original equipment manufacturer devicecertificates 2346 (OEM device certificates 2346), or other devicecertificates. The device certificates can include information about theprogrammable devices 128 including public keys, the deviceidentification 302 of FIG. 3, a silicon vendor identifier 2356, the OEMidentifier 2366, or other similar information.

The silicon vendor device certificate 2326 is set of data elements thatsecurely define the identity of one of the secure elements, such as theprogrammable devices 128 or trusted device 130 of FIG. 1. The siliconvendor device certificate 2326 can include the device identification 302of FIG. 3, a silicon vendor public key 2354, and/or other securityinformation. Information encrypted by a silicon vendor private key 2358can be decrypted using the silicon vendor public key 2354 of a siliconvendor key pair 2360.

The silicon vendor device certificate 2326 can be programmed into asecure storage unit of the secure element by the silicon vendor ormanufacturer before the secure elements are transferred to othermanufacturers or users. The silicon vendor device certificate 2326 canbe stored in a write-once secure storage unit where additionalinformation may be added to the silicon vendor device certificate 2326,but existing information cannot be erased or modified. Portions of thesecure storage unit can be locked when no further changes are required.The secure storage unit can include one or more data elements, such asmultiple device certificates and other related security data.

The silicon vendor device certificates 2326 can be implemented in avariety of ways. For example, the silicon vendor device certificates2326 can be implemented using the manufacturing markers 510 of FIG. 5,the security certificate 306 of FIG. 3, the security algorithm 304 ofFIG. 3, the product markers 508 of FIG. 5, the operating markers 514 ofFIG. 5, the incoming root of trust 504 of FIG. 5, the trustedcertificate 402 of FIG. 4, or another similar data element.

The MSP system 2302 can include a device data tracking system 2334 forproviding device level programming statistics in real time. The devicedata tracking system 2334 can track device level information for thesecure programming system 100 in the local factory or for devices beingprovisioned remotely. The device data tracking system 2334 can trackdevice level information for each of the programmable devices 128configured by the programmer 112 in the MSP system 2302. The device datatracking system 2334 can track data such as the silicon vendor devicecertificates 2326, the system identification 814 of FIG. 8, the deviceidentification 302, or other data elements that have been programmedinto devices. The device data tracking system 2334 can track devicestatus including validity status, configuration status, duplicatestatus, or other device level status.

The MSP system 2302 can include a device provisioning service 2338. Thedevice provisioning service 2338 is a system for provisioning theprogrammable devices 128 over the Internet. The device provisioningservice 2338 can be a combination of hardware and software that cansecurely deliver provisioning information to the programmable devices128 in the field. The device provisioning service 2338 can distributesecurity information, data updates, software updates, and other securityand operational information needed for continued secure operation of thedevices.

The MSP system 2302 can include a firmware update service 2312. Thefirmware update service 2312 is a system for updating the firmware ofthe programmable devices 128 over the Internet, such as an OEM cloud2328. The firmware update service 2312 can securely deliver firmwareupdates 2316 to a system having one or more of the programmable devices128 and update the programmable devices 128 with the new firmware. Thefirmware updates 2316 are software and data packages used to update thefirmware in the programmable devices 128. The firmware update service2312 can be part of a system having security software and hardware thatcan deploy the firmware updates 2316 and associated security informationto ensure the programmable devices 128 are updated securely.

The MSP system 2302 can be operated in a variety of ways. In anillustrative example, the MSP system 2302 can be operated based on asecure element use case 2370. The secure element use case 2370 candescribe one way to use the MSP system 2302 to securely program theprogrammable devices 128 where the programmable devices 128 are alreadyconfigured with firmware and have the silicon vendor device certificate2326 pre-installed at the silicon vendor facility.

The secure element use case 2370 can include two major steps. In step 1,the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 is extracted from one of theprogrammable devices 128 and the device is authenticated. In step 2, theOEM device certificate 2346 is created based on the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326 of the authenticated device. Then the OEM devicecertificate 2346 is programmed into the device.

In this use case, an HSM-based security system, such as the factorysecurity system 2332, can be integrated as part of the secureprogramming system 100, such as a system for programming securemicrocontroller units with integrated security areas. The integratedsecurity areas can be protected areas of memory that can be written onceand not changed. This allows the non-modifiable storage of security datasuch as keys, code, or certificates.

The system can include an OEM management system 2324, the factorymanagement system 2330, a job creation and job runner system, and thedevice data tracking system 2334 to manage the status data for theprogrammable devices 128. The various systems can be implemented in avariety of ways. For example, the OEM management system 2324, thefactory management system 2330, a job creation and job runner system,and the device data tracking system 2334 can all be executed as softwareon the host system 2336. In another example, the systems can each run ondedicated hardware.

In this security model, the factory premise 2342 can act as a proxy forthe OEM user and can execute the functionality of the OEM managementsystem 2324. This effectively implies that the OEM user 2368 implicitlytrusts the factory premise 2342 with providing the OEM certificate keymaterials 2304 and the OEM certificate 2351 and setting the productioncount 2348 for the programmable devices 128. Since this activity is doneon the host system 2336 of the programming unit 110 of FIG. 1, the jobsetup, the generation of the OEM certificate key material 2304, and theconfiguration of the secure programming system 100 be done by authorizedpersonnel at a physically secure location within the factory premise2342.

Some implementations can focus on the provisioning of the OEM devicecertificates 2346 onto the programmable devices 128 that are beingconfigured as secure elements. However, it is understood that securingthe flow of the OEM certificate key material 2304 and secure updating ofthe production count 2348 by the OEM systems are protected by physicalsecurity means and secure data channels.

The OEM data from the OEM development premise 2340 is secure andencrypted from OEM management system 2324 all the way to the factorysecurity system 2332 as the data is encrypted and tied to a specific oneof the factory security system 2332. For example, the programmingproject 2344 can be encrypted using the factory security systemcertificate 2333 which can only be decrypted by the intended one of thefactory security system 2332.

In another example, the transfer of the OEM certificate key material2304, including the OEM device certificate signature key 2347 is donesecurely because the material is encrypted during transmission. The OEMdevice certificate signature key 2347 can include a private keycomponent.

In an illustrative example, since the private key 152 of theprogrammable devices 128 never leaves the device and the import of theOEM device certificate signature key 2347 into OEM management system2324 is done securely. This can reduce the need for physical securitysince the data is encrypted.

In another illustrative example, the MSP system 2302 can be operatedbased on a microcontroller unit use case 2372 where the MSP system 2302is used for provisioning the programmable devices 128 and trusteddevices 130 of FIG. 1, such as secure microcontroller units. The securemicrocontroller units can include secure processing and secure storagefacilities.

The MCU use case 2372 can include two primary steps. In the first step,the OEM security boot loader 2306 can be programmed into theprogrammable devices 128. Afterward, the programmable devices 128 can bebooted using the OEM security boot loader 2306 to create deviceauthentication key pairs 2374 and device decryption key pairs 2376 forthe programmable devices 128. Then the OEM device certificate 2346 canbe constructed, programmed, and signed using portions of the two keypairs. For example, the system can include an authentication key pairhaving a signature key and a verification key, an encryption key pairhaving an encryption key and a decryption key, or similar key pairstructures. The public key and the private key of the key pair arelinked to one another.

In the second step, the MSP system 2302 can read the silicon vendordevice certificates 2326 and authenticate the programmable devices 128.The firmware decrypt key 2322 can be encrypted with device decryptionkey from the silicon vendor device certificate 2326. The encryptedfirmware and the encrypted firmware decrypt key 2322 can be programmedon the programmable devices 128.

The OEM security boot loader 2306, the OEM firmware development 2308,the OEM mastering tool 2310, the OEM management system 2324, and thegeneration of the OEM certificate key material 2304 can all be performedat the OEM development premise 2340. The overall project definition andthe determination of the production count 2348 are controlled by OEMuser 2368.

The OEM software execution environment can be hosted on a computer atthe OEM development premise 2340. All the OEM Roots of Trust aresecurely transported from the OEM development premise 2340 to thefactory premise 2342. The factory management system 2330, the factorysecurity system 2332, and the device data tracking system 2334 canexecute at the factory premise 2342 on the host system 2336.

In an embodiment, because the first step requires secure provisioning ofthe programmable devices 128, it must be performed in a secure facility,such as an OEM trusted factory, a silicon vendor factory, an OEMfactory, or a programming center. Step 2 can then be performed at afacility with a lower level of security, such as an untrusted Factory, aContract Manufacturer, third party partner, or a similar type offacility.

In this Security model, the OEM Roots of Trust and the programmingproject 2344 are defined at the OEM development premise 2340 and thedistributed to the factory premise 2342. It is important that an OEMuser should manager their own Roots of Trust to improve security of thesupply chain for the OEM products.

In an illustrative example, the MCU use case 2372 requires physicalsecurity because the key pair 150 of FIG. 1 of the programmable devices128 is generated in the factory security system 2332 and can potentiallybe exposed at the factory premise 2342. The physical connection betweenthe programmable devices 128 and the programmer 112 is in the clear, sosomeone with physical access to the systems of the factory premise 2342could snoop and steal important information. Thus, physical securityshould be implemented to protect the security information.

In an alternate example of the MCU use case 2372, the programmabledevices 128 can be blank and not pre-programmed with the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326. In this case, the OEM device certificate 2346can be used for authentication. In addition, the firmware decrypt key2322 can be encrypted using the public decryption key from the OEMdevice certificate 2346, such as the OEM public key 2362.

In another illustrative example, the system can implement a challengeresponse authentication protocol by sending an identification token thathas been encrypted by a public key to the programmable device 128, suchas a secure microcontroller, and verifying the identification token bydecrypting the identification token with a private key. The public keycan be the device public key for the programmable device and the privatekey can be the device private key for the programmable device.Implementing the challenge response authentication can improve securityby verifying the identity of sender of content.

FIG. 24 illustrates an example of the secure element use case 2370. Thesecure element use case 2370 describes the process for securelyconfiguring the secure elements, such as the programmable devices 128 ofFIG. 1. The MSP system 2302 of FIG. 23 can securely deploy and provisioneach of the programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1 according to the secureelement use case 2370.

In the secure element use case 2370, the secure elements can beinstantiated, transferred, and managed at different premises. Thepremises can include different types of locations such as a siliconmanufacturer 2404, an OEM location 2406, a programming center 2408, aprogrammer location 2410, and a device location 2412. Each of thepremises represents a location where some type of secure programmingrelated actions can occur. Further, the use case can include data andactions embedded at the programmer 112 of FIG. 1 and the device location2412.

The secure element use case 2370 can include three different sequencesof events, each for performing a different secure activity. In a firstsequence 2414, the MSP system 2302 of FIG. 23 can initialize the factorysecurity system 2332 of FIG. 23 using OEM management system 2324 of FIG.23. This can be performed at the OEM development premise 2340 of FIG.23, the factory premise 2342 of FIG. 23, or another similar location.For example, the secure elements can be programmed at the silicon vendorfactory with a silicon vendor device certificate.

The MSP system 2302 can also initialize the factory management system2330 of FIG. 23 at the factory premise 2342, the programming center2408, or another similar location. The factory management system 2330can be updated with the current count 2378, a silicon vendor public key2354 of FIG. 23, an OEM private key 2352 of FIG. 23, and a OEM devicecertificate template 2350 of FIG. 23. The factory management system 2330can forward the information to the factory security system 2332 forsecure processing.

In the second sequence 2416, the secure elements are programmed at thesilicon vendor (SV) factory with a silicon vendor device certificate2326 of FIG. 23. For example, the factory security system can beinitialized using the OEM management system 2324 and the factorymanagement system with a count, the silicon vendor public key, the OEMsignature key, and the OEM device certificate.

In a third sequence 2418, the MSP system 2302 can cryptographicallyauthenticate each of the devices, such as the programmable devices 128or trusted devices 130 of FIG. 1, using the silicon vendor devicecertificate 2326 that was pre-installed in the second sequence 2416.Then the OEM device certificate 2346 of FIG. 23 can be constructed andprogrammed into the programmable devices 128.

The OEM device certificate 2346 can be constructed by re-using thepublic key portions of the device identity key pair from the siliconvendor device certificate 2326, such as the silicon vendor public key2354. Therefore, the silicon vendor public key 2354 can be used tocalculate the OEM device certificate 2346, so both certificates arecertified using the same certificate. Alternatively, a different keypair can be used to represent the OEM identity separate from the siliconvendor key pair. This can be performed by the factory security system2332 or on the secure element itself.

In the second sequence 2416, step 2420 is performed at the siliconmanufacturer 2404. The silicon manufacturer 2404 can be the company thatcreates the raw secure elements. The silicon vendor device certificates2326 of FIG. 23 are created for each of the secure elements, such as theprogrammable devices 128 or trusted devices 130. The silicon vendordevice certificates 2326 can include unique information about each ofthe secure elements, such as the device identification 302 of FIG. 3,serial numbers, product type, manufacture date, or similar deviceinformation.

Step 2422 is also performed at the silicon manufacturer 2404. Each ofthe silicon vendor device certificates 2326 is signed with the siliconvendor private key 2358 of FIG. 23 of the silicon manufacture with thesilicon vendor identifier 2356 of FIG. 23. Signing the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326 encrypts the data of the certificate. The datacan be decrypted only with the silicon vendor public key 2354.

Step 2424 is also performed at the silicon manufacturer 2404. Each ofthe programmable devices 128 is programmed with the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326 that was signed with the silicon vendor privatekey 2358. The silicon vendor device certificate 2326 signed by thesilicon vendor private key 2358 shows that the device is approved orprovided by the silicon vendor. Successfully decrypting the siliconvendor device certificate 2326 with the silicon vendor public key 2354can authenticate that the programmable device 128 is from the siliconvendor that signed it.

The second sequence 2416 can uniquely tag each of the programmabledevices 128 with a unique and individual instance of the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326 that has been further signed with the siliconvendor private key 2358. This provides that the silicon vendor devicecertificate 2326 can be decoded using the silicon vendor public key 2354to verify that the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 was providedby the silicon vendor having the silicon vendor identifier 2356. Thisallows the factory or other device user to determine the authenticity ofthe programmable devices 128.

The first sequence 2414 is performed at the silicon manufacturer 2404,the OEM location 2406, and the programming center 2408. The firstsequence 2414 can configure the programming components at theprogramming center 2408 for secure programming.

In a step 2430, the silicon vendor can generate the silicon vendor keypair 2360 having a silicon vendor public key 2354 and a silicon vendorprivate key 2358. This can be a silicon vendor key pair 2360 having asilicon vendor private key 2358 and silicon vendor public key 2354.

In a step 2432, the silicon vendor public key 2354 can be transferred tothe OEM user 2406. The silicon vendor public key 2354 can be sent in theclear and unencrypted. For example, the silicon vendor public key 2354can be sent over a network link.

In a step 2434, the OEM user 2406 can register the OEM certificate 2351of FIG. 23 with the factory management system 2330 of FIG. 23 and thefactory security system 2332 of FIG. 23 of the programming center 2408.The OEM certificate 2351 can include the OEM public key 2362 of FIG. 23to decrypt and authenticate information that was encrypted or signedwith the OEM private key 2362. The registration of the OEM certificateat the programming center 2408 can be performed securely to provide theprogramming center 2408 with the security information for the OEM user2406. The registration can be performed to introduce and identify theOEM credentials into the factory management system 2330 and the factorysecurity system 2332.

In a step 2435, the factory management system 2330 and the factorysecurity system 2332 can send a factory security data encryption key2380 to the OEM management system 2324 in a secure exchange process. Thefactory security data encryption key 2380 can be used to encryptinformation sent from the OEM user 2406 to the factory management system2330 and the factory security system 2332 to support the secure transferof information. The factory security system 2332 can send the factorysecurity system data encryption key to the OEM management system 2324.

In a step 2436, the OEM user 2406 can create aa package having the SVdevice authentication public key, the OEM device certificate signaturekey, and the OEM device certificate template 2350. The OEM devicecertificate signature key can be created in OEM management system 2324or import from an external security system such as an external HSM.

The package can be encrypted in the OEM management system 2324 using thefactory security data encryption key 2380 and then sent to the factorymanagement system 2330 and the factory security system 2332. Because thepackage has been encrypted using the factory security data encryptionkey 2380 of the factory security system 2332, it can only be decryptedusing the factory security data authentication key 2382 of the factorysecurity system 2332.

The OEM device certificate template 2350 is a template for the OEMdevice certificate 2346 that includes the public key 154 of the devicehaving the device identification 320 of FIG. 3 and then signed by theOEM Private Signature key. The OEM public key 2362 is a cryptographicvalue tied to the OEM user 2406. The OEM public key 2362 have a varietyof formats.

For example, the key can be formatted as an X.509 public key certificateor another public key format. The X.509 standard defines a public keycertificate to show the ownership of a public key. The OEM public key2362 can provide validation information for a public key. The OEM publickey 2362 can be used for device certification in the programming center2408.

In a step 2438, the OEM user 2406 can send the package having thesilicon vendor public key 2354, the OEM private key 2352, and the OEMdevice certificate template 2350 to the programming center 2408. Theinformation in the package can then be used to sign the programmabledevices 128.

The third sequence 2418 is performed on the programmer 112 and theprogrammable devices 128 at the programming center 2408 or a factorypremise 2342. The third sequence 2418 can authenticate the secureelements, provision and cryptographically sign the secure elements withthe OEM information, and verify that the provisioned devices areauthorized. For example, the system can cryptographically authenticatethe secure element device, one that already has the programmed siliconvendor device certificate from the first sequence. Then the system canconstruct and program a new OEM device certificate into the device. TheOEM device certificate can be created re-using the device identity keypair from the silicon vendor certificate. The same key pair is used forboth certificates. Alternatively, a new key pair can be generated torepresent the OEM identity separate from the silicon vendor key pair.This can be performed in the factory security system or in the deviceitself.

In a step 2440, the programmer 112 can read the silicon vendor devicecertificate 2326 of each of the programmable devices 128 to beprogrammed. The silicon vendor device certificates 2326 are transferredin the clear from the programmable devices 128 to the programmer 112.

In a step 2442, the silicon vendor device certificates 2326 can betransferred from the programmer 112 to the factory management system2330 and the factory security system 2332. The factory management system2330 controls the programming operation and the factory security system2332 will manage the device and system security.

In a step 2444, the silicon vendor device certificates 2326 are receivedat the factory management system 2330 of the programming center 2408.The programmer 112 is located at the factory premise 2342 of FIG. 23.

In a step 2446, the programmable devices 128 can be authenticated usingthe silicon vendor public key 2354. This step confirms that the devicesto be programmed are provided by the silicon vendor having the siliconvendor identifier 2356. The programmable devices 128 are authenticatedwhen the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 that was signed with thesilicon vendor private key 2358 in sequence 1 is decrypted using thesilicon vendor public key 2354. If the information in the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326 can be accessed using the silicon vendor publickey 2354, then the device is authenticated.

In a step 2448, the OEM device certificate 2346 is formatted based onthe OEM device certificate template 2350. Then OEM device certificate2346 is signed with the OEM private key 2352.

In an illustrative example, a device certificate, such as the OEM devicecertificate 2346, can be generated for the programmable devices 2412 bythe programmer 2410. The OEM device certificate 2346 can be created bythe OEM using the programmer 2410 to create a device certificate for theprogrammable devices 128 that are passive. Passive examples of theprogrammable devices can include memory device without controllers orprocessors. Such device can externally programed with the devicecertificate to provide identity and security support.

In a step 2450, the OEM device certificate 2346 is transferred to theprogrammer 112. Because the OEM device certificate 2346 has beenencrypted and signed with the OEM private key 2352, it can betransferred in the clear.

In a step 2452, the programmer 112 can build the serial data lists 2364.The serial data lists 2364 are list of device specific data to beprogrammed into the programmable devices 128. This can include theserial numbers, the device identification, the OEM device certificate2346, manufacturing markers, code, data, markers, mac addresses, devicespecific keys, or other information.

In a step 2454, the device specific data included on the serial datalists 2364 can be programmed into the programmable devices 128 by theprogrammer 112. The serial data lists 2364 can indicate where the devicespecific data should be stored. For example, the OEM device certificate2346 can be stored in the secure storage unit.

In a step 2456, the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 and the OEMdevice certificate 2346 are re-extracted and retrieved from the secureelements, such as the programmable devices 128 or the trusted devices130, by the programmer 112. Even though copies of the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326 and the OEM device certificate 2346 may alreadyexist in the factory security system 2332 or elsewhere in the system,the device certificates are re-extracted to verify the programmabledevices 128 and to detect potential duplicate production runs,unauthorized duplication, or other improper activities. The validationsteps can be used to ensure that the device certificates have beenprogrammed without errors. This can include programming failures, devicedamages, bit errors, or similar errors.

In a step 2458, the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 and the OEMdevice certificate 2346 are sent to the factory security system 2332 forverification and further use. The retrieved device certificates can beused for a second round of authentication to verify that the proper onesof the programmable devices 128 were programmed. This can be used toprevent unauthorized duplicate of the programmable devices 128 and toprevent counterfeiting the devices.

In a step 2460, the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 and the OEMdevice certificate 2346 are verified to make sure that the programmabledevices 128 are proper. This can include validating the silicon vendordevice certificate 2326 using the silicon vendor public key 2354 andvalidating the OEM device certificate 2346 with the OEM public key 2362.Validation of the device certificate involves comparing the public keyin the device certificate with the public key in the silicon vendorcertificate to ensure they match. In addition, the certificate can beprocessed through a certificate validation tool (not shown) to ensurethat the format of the certificate is valid. The signature on thecertificate is also validated using the factory security system 2332.

In a step 2462, the verification results are sent back to the programmer112. In a step 2464, the programmer 112 can processed the completeddevices. If the programmable devices 128 are not validated, then theprogrammer 112 can identify the devices with a validation statusindicating a bad device and transfer them to a bad devices receptacle(not shown) for disposal. If the programmable devices 128 are properlyverified, then the programmable devices 128 can be updated with averified state value and passed along as verified components.Alternatively, the programmer 112 can generate a validation report tolog the device identification and the validation status of each of theprogrammable devices 128 in the production run. The programmable devices128 that are invalid can be removed or destroyed at a later time.

3.0. Functional Overview

FIG. 25 illustrates an example of a secure provisioning process flow2502 for the programmable devices 128 of FIG. 1 in accordance with oneor more embodiments. The various elements of the secure provisioningprocess flow 2502 may be performed in a variety of systems, includingsystems such as system 100 described above. In an embodiment, each ofthe processes described in connection with the functional blocksdescribed below may be implemented using one or more computer programs,other software elements, and/or digital logic in any of ageneral-purpose computer or a special-purpose computer, while performingdata retrieval, transformation, and storage operations that involveinteracting with and transforming the physical state of memory of thecomputer.

The secure provisioning process flow 2502 is responsible for securelyprogramming, configuring, provisioning, and operating the programmabledevices 128. The programmable devices 128 can be programmed with thetarget payload 1420 of FIG. 14 provided by the secure programming system100. The secure provisioning process flow 2502 can be responsible forconfiguring the programmable devices 128, configuring the programmabledevices 128, provisioning the programmable devices 128, and validatingthe programmable devices 128.

The secure provisioning process flow 2502 can have a variety ofconfigurations. For example, the secure provisioning process flow 2502can include a configure components module 2504, a configure trusteddevices module 2506, a provisioning module 2508, and a device operationmodule 2510.

The configure components module 2504 can implement a componentconfiguration process to configure the programmable devices 128,including the data devices 132 of FIG. 1, as described earlier in thisdocument. The configure components module 2504 can receive the targetpayload 1420 of FIG. 14 and encrypt it to form the encrypted payload1422 of FIG. 14 and program the encrypted payload 1422 into theprogrammable devices 128 using the programmer 112 of FIG. 1. Theencryption process can include extracting the incoming root of trust 504of FIG. 5 from the programmable devices 128 and using the incoming rootof trust 504 as part of the encryption process to allow the programmabledevices 128 to have the encrypted payload 1422 decrypted only if theincoming root of trust 504 is available to one of the programmabledevices 128.

The configure trusted devices module 2506 can implement a trusteddevices configuration process to configure the trusted devices 130including installing other programmable devices 128 into the trusteddevices 130, associating security elements with the programmable devices128 and the trusted devices 130, and transferring the encrypted payload1422 of FIG. 14 into the programmable devices 128. The trusted devices130 can include circuit boards for a wide variety of electronic productsincluding smart phones, consumer electronic devices, industrialelectronic devices, networking equipment, computers, and other similardevices.

The provisioning module 2508 can implement a provisioning process forthe trusted devices 130 by transferring security data and code to thetrusted devices 130. The provisioning process can take place during orafter the manufacturing stages. The provisioning module 2508 cantransfer the information in a variety of ways. For example, theinformation can be transferred over a network link, via a memory card,over the air using a wireless network link, or a combination thereof.

The device operation module 2510 can implement a variety of operationalprocesses to operate the trusted devices 130 using the informationtransferred by the previous modules. The device operation module 2510can implement the use cases described earlier.

The device operation module 2510 can implement a secure boot process asdescribed in the secure boot use case shown in FIG. 16. The secure bootprocess can boot the trusted devices 130 in a secure manner using thefirst stage boot loader 1610 of FIG. 16, the second stage boot loader1616 of FIG. 16, the operating system 1618 of FIG. 16, and theapplications, such as the first application 1620 of FIG. 16, the secondapplication 1622 of FIG. 16, the third application 1624 of FIG. 16, andthe nth application 1626 of FIG. 16.

The device operation module 2510 can implement a device provisioningprocess as described in the device provisioning use case shown in FIG.17. The device operation module 2510 can use the provisioning agent 1704of FIG. 17 to receive the provisioning information and deploy theinformation to the trusted device 130.

The device operation module 2510 can implement a tamper detectionprocess as described in the tamper detection use case shown in FIG. 18.The tamper detection process can use the monitoring agent 1804 of FIG.18 to detect changes in the code and data stored in the trusted devices130.

The device operation module 2510 can implement an internet of thingsprocess as described in the internet of things use case shown in FIG.19. The internet of things use case can facilitate the communicationbetween the internet of things devices 1912 of FIG. 19 and back endsystems.

The device operation module 2510 can implement a security and dataprogramming process as described in the security and data programminguse case 2002 of FIG. 20. The security and data programming process cangenerate security elements based on the device seed 2004 of FIG. 20 andthe root key 2010 of FIG. 20. The security elements can include thesecurity kernel, the security boot loader, the device certificate 2014of FIG. 20, the public device signing key 2006 of FIG. 20, the dataencryption public key 2008 of FIG. 20, and other similar securityvalues.

The off device seed use case 2102 of FIG. 21 can implement an off deviceseed and certificate generation process as described in the off deviceseed use case 2102 as shown in FIG. 21. The off device and certificategeneration process can program security elements into the trusteddevices 130 and verify the installation based on the device certificateand the module list.

The second off device seed use case 2102 can implement a second offdevice seed and certificate generation process as described in thesecond off device seed use case 2102 as shown in FIG. 21. The second offdevice and certificate generation process can program security elementsinto the trusted devices 130 and verify the installation based on thedevice certificate and the module list.

The second off device seed use case 2102 can implement a second offdevice seed and certificate generation process as described in thesecond off device seed use case 2102 as shown in FIG. 21. The second offdevice and certificate generation process can program security elementsinto the trusted devices 130 and verify the installation based on thedevice certificate and the module list.

For example, the provisioning module 2508 can program each of theprogrammable devices 128, such as the data devices 132, with the filesof encrypted payload 1422. The provisioning module 2508 can includespecific information for configuring each different device type of theprogrammable devices 128. The data devices 132 can be coupled to theprogrammer 112 using the device adapters 208 of FIG. 2.

In another example, the provisioning module 2508 can provision each ofthe programmable devices 128. It is understood that the programmabledevices 128 can include the trusted devices 130, secure objects, smartdevices. The trusted devices 130 can include smart phones, circuitboards, security devices, or similar devices. The trusted devices 130can be coupled to the programmer 112 directly in the device adapters208, via a data link such as a wired or wireless connection, or acombination thereof.

Provisioning is the installation of the content on the programmabledevices 128. For example, provisioning can include copying firmwarecode, software, data, images, video, or other content onto theprogrammable devices 128. Provisioning can include securely installingthe content onto the programmable devices 128 by authenticating thecontent before deployment, by storing the content in the secure storageunit 326, encrypting the content on the programmable devices 128,storing the content in a write-once storage area, write protecting thecontent, or using other secure storage techniques.

In an illustrative example, the secure programming system 100 canestablish the identity of each of the programmable devices 128 based onthe components used to build the system. For each of the trusted devices130, such as smart phones or circuit boards, the device identification302 of FIG. 3 can include serial numbers or other identifiers for eachof the components within the trusted devices 130. The identity of theprogrammable devices 128 can span hardware, software, and/or firmwarecomponents.

Because the device identification 302 can include the OEM markers 516 ofFIG. 5, the identification can be unique across all manufacturers andvendors. In addition, because the device identification 302 can beencrypted by the secure programming system 100 at manufacturing time,the identity of the programmable devices 128 can be stored securely offthe device and on the device using the device identification 302 and thesecurity keys 106 of FIG. 1

Another advantage of the secure programming system 100 is that thesystem identification 814 of FIG. 8 can be used to provide a higherlevel of device security. By encoding the programmable devices 128 withan encrypted version of the system identification 814, the programmabledevices 128 have a higher level of trust and traceability for theremainder of the lifecycle of each of the programmable devices 128.

Yet another additional advantage of the secure programming system 100 isthat the manufacturing supply chain is more secure because the use ofthe system identification 814 provides a root of trust at the silicondevice level. The system identification 814 is programmed into theprogrammable devices 128 and is based on and includes uniquemanufacturing data. The system identification 814 allows compromisedfirmware to be detected because the firmware would not have the systemidentification 814 available in the proper encrypted form.

The block diagram shows only one of many possible flows for secureprogramming. Other flows may include fewer, additional, or differentelements, in varying arrangements. For example, in some embodiments, thesecurity modules may be omitted, along with any other elements reliedupon exclusively by the omitted element(s). As another example, in anembodiment, a flow may further include a hash generation module forcalculating a hash value to determine the integrity of the contentstored on the programmable device 128.

FIG. 26 illustrates a secure programming process flow 2602. The secureprogramming process flow 2602 can configure the programmable devices 128with a security kernel 2620, securely install the target payload 914,and then validate the content in the programmable devices 128. Thevarious elements of the secure programming process flow 2602 may beperformed in a variety of systems, including systems such as system 100described above. In an embodiment, each of the processes described inconnection with the functional blocks described below may be implementedusing one or more computer programs, other software elements, and/ordigital logic in any of a general-purpose computer or a special-purposecomputer, while performing data retrieval, transformation, and storageoperations that involve interacting with and transforming the physicalstate of memory of the computer.

The secure programming process flow 2602 can load a set of theprogrammable devices 128 into the programmer, validate the devices,securely install and validate the security kernel 2620 in the securestorage unit 326 of the programmable devices 128, provision and validatethe programmable devices 128 with the target payload 1420, and generatea validation report 2624 for the configured devices. Although thespecification refers to programming the programmable devices 128 forclarity, it is understood that this term can include the trusted devices130, individual chips, and secure systems such as smart phones, devicecontrollers, consumer devices, industrial devices, and other systems.

The secure programming process flow 2602 can have a variety ofconfiguration. For example, the secure programming process flow 2602 caninclude a receive job control package module 2604, an authenticatedevice module 2606, a validate security kernel module 2608, a provisiondevice module 2610, a generate validation status module 2612, and agenerate report module 2614.

The receive job control package module 2604 can receive the job controlpackage 1418 that defines the parameters of the operations to beperformed on the programmable devices 128. The job control package 1418can be provided from the OEM 2406, a known third party, a user at theprogramming center 2408, or other trusted sources. The job controlpackage 1418, which can include the programming project 2344, drives thedevice programming process.

The job control package 1418 can be configured to authorize theprogramming of a set of the programmable devices 128. The job controlpackage 1418 can be created and authorized by an authorized entity, suchas a manufacturer, an OEM, or other entity responsible for authorizingthe production of the devices. For example, the job control package 1418could be create by a consumer product manufacturer who is authorizingthe production and programming of devices containing the software tooperate their latest products. Limiting the job control package 1418allows the manufacturer to prevent unauthorized manufacturer of theirproducts, such as smart phones or other intelligent devices.

The job control package 1418 can be configured to limit production tospecific programmers, specific locations, or specific secure programmingsystems. For example, the OEM use can use the OEM development laboratory1410 to create the job control package 1418. The job control package1418 can include the target payload 1420 and the security kernel 2620having the security boot loader 2318.

The job control package 1418 can be completely or partially encrypted toprotect the content. The OEM can generate one or more of the key pairs150 for protecting the job control package 1418 and the target payload1420. In one example, the key pairs 150 can be generated using theOEM/CA public key infrastructure system 1414 having the certificatemanagement backend 1416. This can include generating the key pairs 150for the job control package, the target payload 1420, the programmabledevices 128, the OEM, and other security entities in the system.

The job control package 1418 and the target payload 1420 can beencrypted and then sent to the secure programming environment 108. Thekey pairs 150 can be securely transferred to the hardware securitymodule 1404 of the secure programming environment 108. The secureprogramming environment 108 is a specific configuration of the secureprogramming system 100 with the appropriate security modules. It isunderstood that the secure programming environment 108 can includeinterfacing with the factory management system 2330 to deploy theinformation to the proper systems.

The job control package 1418 can be securely received by the secureprogramming system 100 having the programming unit 110, the programmer112, and the security controller 114. The job control package 1418 caninclude information about the devices to be programmed including thesecurity kernel 2620, the target payload 1420, security keys, theproduction count 2348, and other information about the manufacturingjob. The secure programming system 100 can be located in the programmingcenter or other manufacturing location.

Secure reception can be performed in a variety of ways. For example, thejob control package 1418 can be sent from an authorized user to thesecure programming system 100 in encrypted format. Portions or theentirety of the job control package 1418 can be encrypted into anencrypted format using a hardware security module to encrypt the packageusing public keys associated with one or more of the system, users,entities, or locations related to the secure programming system 100.

The job control package 1418 can be decrypted by the secure programmingsystem 100 using a private key associated with the secure programmingsystem 100, such as the programmer private key, an OEM private key, theprivate key of the target manufacturing facility, or other similarencryption key. The secure programming system 100 can use the securitycontroller 114, such as the hardware security module 1404, to performcryptographic functions using enhanced hardware and software features toimprove performance.

In another example, secure reception can be performed by physicallydelivering the content to the secure programming system 100 in aprotected way. This could include delivering the content on a protectedphysical media, using dedicated network links, or other physicalsecurity techniques.

The security kernel 2620 is a device specific software or firmwaremodule that can be deployed to the secure storage unit 326 and can beused to securely operate the programmable devices 128. The securitykernel 2620 can be implemented in different ways, such as a securityboot loader, a first boot loader, a secure operating system, or othersecure system. The security kernel 2620 can be executed in the secureexecution unit 324 on the programmable devices 128.

The job control package 1418 can include the security kernel 2620 andthe target payload 1420 as encrypted content targeted for a specificOEM, factory, user, programmer 112, or secure programming system 100.For example, the security kernel 2620 can be included in the job controlpackage 1418 in a format encrypted using the public key of theprogrammer 112 at a specific factory location. Once the job controlpackage 1418 is received by the secure programming system 100, thesecurity kernel 2620 can be extracted and decrypted using the internalprivate key of the programmer 112. The private key can be different foreach particular one of the programmer 112 to allow targeted deploymentto a particular unit for security reasons. Encrypting the securitykernel 2620 and targeting a particular system or user prevents any othersystems from using the security kernel 2620 in the job control package1418. This can control unauthorized manufacture or distribution of thecontent.

In an illustrative example, the security kernel 2620 can be executedwhen the programmable devices 128 is booted, initialized, or powered up.The system is configured such that when the system is started, only thesecurity kernel 2620 can be executed. The security kernel 2620 can beexecuted in a secure mode to prevent tampering or outside interference.

The target payload 1420 includes the content to be installed in theprogrammable devices 128. For example, the target payload 1420 caninclude firmware images, security information, data, and other content.The target payload 1420 can include content that is encrypted, signedwith a security key, unencrypted, or partially encrypted.

Once the job control package 1418 has been received by the secureprogramming system 100, it can be processed by the programming unit 110and the security controller 114. For example, the security controller114 can decrypt the encrypted portions of the target payload 1420,verify digital signatures, and generate additional keys and devicecertificates.

In another example, the programming unit 110 can merge the content ofthe target payload 1420 with the security kernel 2620 to form a combinedmodule for secure execution. Alternatively, the programming unit 110 andthe security controller 114 can generate custom data to support thesecure operation of the programmable devices 128.

The job control package 1418 can include data and instructions to limitthe execution of the information in the job control package 1418 to aparticular OEM, contract manufacturer, factory, programming center,programming system, or programmer. For example, the job control package1418 can limit the execution of the production run to only a system thatcan authenticate using the OEM public key 2362 linked to the OEMcertificate 2351 provided in the job control package 1418. After thereceive job control package module 2604 has been completed, the controlflow can be transferred to the authenticate device module 2606.

The authenticate device module 2606 can load a set of the programmabledevices 128 into the programmer 110 and authenticate the devices. Theauthenticate device module 2606 can operate to prevent the use ofunauthorized devices in a production run by detecting unauthorizeddevices and preventing the programming of such devices.

The job control package 1418 can include an authentication list 2632 toidentify the set of the programmable devices 128 to be programmed. Theauthentication list 2632 is a data structure describing the devicesauthorized to be programmed.

The authentication list 2632 can be implemented in a variety of ways.For example, the authentication list 2632 can be a set of serial numbersor other device identifiers. The authentication list 2632 can also be arange of identifier values that can be used to identify the individualprogrammable devices, the silicon manufacturer or vendor, the type ofdevices, or a combination thereof. In another example, theauthentication list 2632 can include structured data, such as a datastructure having pairs of data items including the silicon vendoridentifier 2356 and the serial number markers 512 for each of theauthorized devices.

The authentication list 2632 can be used to limit the manufacture of theprogrammable devices 128. The authenticate device module 2606 cancompare the serial number of the programmable device 128 to the serialnumbers in the authentication list 2632. If the serial number, or otheridentifier, of the programmable device 128 matches an entry in theauthentication list 2632, then the device can be programmed. If theserial number does not match an entry in the authentication list 2632,then the programmable devices 128 can be invalidated. Invalidation meansthat the devices are identified as unusable devices.

The programmable device 128 can be invalidated in a variety of ways. Forexample, the programmer 112 can overwrite the data in the programmabledevice 128 with blank or invalid data. The programmer 112 can move theprogrammable device 128 to a disposal bin. The programmer 112 can writean invalid status to the programmable device 128, such as in a securestorage area, to invalidate the device. The programmer 112 can programthe programmable device 128 with an invalidation code to invalidate thedevice. It is understood that the programmable devices 128 can implementin differ ways based on the specific hardware configuration of thesystem.

Loading the programmable devices 128 can include mounting theprogrammable devices 128 in an adapter on the programmer 112 such thatthe programmer 112 can perform programming operations on theprogrammable devices 128. The programmable device 128 can be mounted inthe destination sockets 210 of the device adapters 208. The programmabledevices 128 can be received from the input device receptacle 206, acomponent tray, a device feeder, a bin, or other device source.

The authenticate device module 2606 can retrieve secure information,such as the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 or the OEM devicecertificate 2346, from the programmable devices 128 and authenticate thedevice by authenticating against the silicon vendor public key 2354 orthe OEM public key 2362, respectively. The secure information can alsoinclude the serial number markers 512, the incoming root of trust 504,the firmware markers 506, the manufacturing markers 510, the productmarkers 508, the OEM markers 516, the operating markers 514, key pairs150, or other similar information.

The authenticate device module 2606 can log the authentication statusinformation into the device data tracking system 2334 to track thestatus of the devices. After the authenticate device module 2606 hasbeen completed, the control flow can be transferred to the validatesecurity kernel module 2608.

The validate security kernel module 2608 can program the security kernel2620 into the programmable device 128 and then validate the properoperation of the security kernel 2620 within the programmable device128. reboot or initialize the programmable device 128 to initiate theexecution of the security kernel 2620 on the programmable device 128.Once the security kernel 2620 is operating, the programmer 112 cancommunicate with the kernel and verify that it is operating properly andinstalled on an authorized device.

The security kernel 2620 can be securely stored on the programmabledevice 128. For example, the security kernel 2620 can be stored in thesecure storage unit 326, as an encrypted file in the data storage area,as a unencrypted file, or a combination thereof. The security kernel2620 can include a calculated hash value that can be used to verify fileintegrity on startup, during operation, or during storage.

The security kernel 2620 can provide a validation code 2626 to show thatit is operating properly. The validation code 2626 is a data or codeelement that can identify the security kernel 2620 executing on theprogrammable device 128. The validation code 2626 can be sent directlyat boot time, in response to a request, be available for retrieval fromthe secure storage unit 326, or a combination thereof. The validationcode 2626 can have a variety of forms including a device certificate, apublic key encoded value, a signed value, a device identifier, a serialnumber, and identification token, a dynamic value, or other similarvalues.

The secure programming system 100 can customize the security kernel 2620to limit operation to a particular device. For example, the securitykernel 2620 can be configured to only execute on the programmable device128 with a pre-defined serial number. This would prevent the securitykernel 2620 from operating on an unauthorized device. The modificationof the security kernel 2620, or any other modified security-relatedcode, can performed by the security controller 114 to verify theintegrity of the new version of the security kernel 2620.

In an example, the programmer 112 of the programming unit 110 can send areboot command 2628 to the security kernel 2620 on the programmabledevice 128 to initiate a device system reboot to start executing thesecurity kernel 2620. The programmer 112 can then request the validationcode 2626 from the security kernel 2620.

Rebooting the programmable device 128 in place in the programmer 112reduces the amount of time needed to validate the security kernel 2620.It can also provide a high level of security by supporting liveauthentication of the security kernel 2620 while it is executing on theprogrammable device 128.

After the device has rebooted, the validate security kernel module 2608can then retrieve the validation code 2626 and authenticate thevalidation code 2626 in a secure manner in the programming unit 110. Inan illustrative example, the programming unit 110 can pass thevalidation code 2626 to the security controller 114, such as a hardwaresecurity module having dedicated cryptographic processing hardware, andthen cryptographically authenticate the validation code 2626 using asigning code or security keys stored in the programming unit 110. Thefirst security module 116 of the programming unit 110 can be theauthentication system module having code and data to authenticate thevalidation code 2626 of the first data device 134.

The security kernel 2620 can provide the logic to generate thevalidation code 2626 in a variety of ways. The security kernel 2620 canactivate after the programmable device 128 receives the reboot commandand executes the security kernel 2620 in the secure execution unit 324.The security kernel 2620 can provide the validation code 2626 byretrieving the code from the secure storage unit 326, calculating thevalidation code 2626 in the secure execution unit 324, calculating thevalidation code 2626 using the security controller 114 of theprogramming unit 110, or other similar secure techniques.

In an illustrative embodiment, the security kernel 2620 can execute thesecurity algorithm 304 to provide the logic to generate the validationcode 2626. The security algorithm 304 can be a programmable code objectthat can execute on the programmable device 128, such as on the secureexecution unit 324. Because the security algorithm 304 can be configuredto execute only on the programmable device 128, it can generate thevalidation code 2626 based on security elements available within thesecure storage unit 326.

In another example, after the reboot the security kernel 2620 canretrieve the validation code 2626, such as pre-programmed data element,that is stored in the secure storage unit 326 and send it to theprogrammer 112. The validation code 2626 can include the devicecertificate 2014, the silicon vendor device certificate 2326, the OEMdevice certificate 2346, or a similar identifying data object.

In yet another example, the security kernel 2620 can validate anidentification value received from the secure programming system 100 andgenerate the validation code 2626 based on the identification value. Theidentification value can be the programmer identification, the systemidentification, the OEM identification, the identification token 624,the cryptographic token 626, or other identity value.

In another embodiment, the security kernel 2620 can be configured toinitialize the security environment of the programmable device 128 thefirst time the device is booted. This can support the creation of thevalidation code 2626 and other security elements by the programmabledevice 128. Creating the security elements within the programmabledevice 128 increases the level of security by minimizing outsideinfluences and access. The security elements can be created internal tothe programmable device 128 and not be exposed outside the device.

When the programmable device 128 is booted the first time, the securitykernel 2620 can include the software agent 1116, such as a boot timeidentifier read agent, that can execute in the secure execution unit 324of the programmable device 128 and generate additional identificationand security elements that can be stored in the secure storage unit 326.These additional identification elements can include the board root oftrust 1106, updates to the device identification 302, the outgoing rootof trust 1006, the device certificate or other security identificationvalues.

For example, the secure programming system 100 can configure a targetsystem, such as a circuit board with the programmable device 128 on theboard. Then the software agent 1116 can read the component root of trust1104 associated with the programmable device 128 and generate the boardroot of trust 1106 for the board or system. This can be the case whenthe target systems are smart phones, media boxes, or other complexsystems. Thus, the board root of trust 1106 is directly linked with eachof the component root of trust 1104 of the devices used to manufacturethe board. The board root of trust 1106 is generated when theprogrammable device 128 is installed on the board is rebooted togenerate the security information. The validation code 2626 can then begenerated based on the component root of trust 1104, the board root oftrust 1106, or other on-board security elements.

The programming unit 110 having the programmer 112 can be configured tosupport the rebooting of the programmable device 128. The programmer 112can interface with the programmable device 128 to provide power, clocksignals, actual or simulated data and control inputs, and othermechanical and electrical inputs required for proper operation. Theprogramming unit 110 can use the security modules to provide thenecessary logic and control needed to successfully reboot theprogrammable device 128 in place. Thus, the programming unit 110 and theprogrammer 112 can support rebooting the programmable device 128 andvalidating proper operation.

The programming unit 110 can use the security controller 114 toauthenticate the validation code 2626 to verify that the security kernel2620 has been properly installed on the programmable device 128. In oneembodiment, the security kernel 2620 can return a signed devicecertificate, such as the silicon vendor device certificate 2326 or theOEM device certificate 2346, and then authenticate the devicecertificate with the correct public key to validate the operation of thesecurity kernel 2620. It is understood that a silicon vendor and asilicon manufacturer can be the same or similar entities.

Once the security kernel 2620 has been validated, the status of theprogrammable device 128 can be logged by the system and the device isready to be provisioned. After the validate security kernel module 2608has been completed, the control flow can be transferred to the provisiondevice module 2610.

The provision device module 2610 can install the target payload 1420 ofthe job control package 1418 onto the programmable devices 128. Afterthe programmable device 128 and the security kernel 2620 have beenverified and authenticated, the provision device module 2610 can programthe devices with the content of the target payload 1420.

Provisioning the device can include decrypting encrypted content in thetarget payload 1420 before installing it on the programmable device 128.For example, the target payload 1420 can include firmware to beinstalled in the secure storage unit 326, images, video, software, data,security information, data, and other content.

The target payload 1420 can include content that is encrypted and signedwith a security key. In one example, the security key can be linked tothe validation code 2626 of the security kernel 2620. The programmingunit 110 can use the security features of the security controller 114 toauthenticate and decrypt the encrypted content of the target payload1420. The security controller 114 can be a hardware and/or softwaremodule configured for high performance security operations.

The target payload 1420 can include utility and security software to beused by the programmable devices 128. For example, the target payload1420 can include software for the identification module 316, thecryptography module 318, the authentication module 320, and the codesigning module 322. The modules can also include the security algorithms1504 to perform specific security tasks.

In an alternative remote provisioning embodiment, the programmabledevice 128 can be provisioned remotely over a network link using aremote provisioning service, such as the device provisioning service2338, the firmware update service 2312, or a similar provisioningservice feature. The programmable device 128 can include theprovisioning agent 1704 to securely receive the target payload 1420 andthen deploy the content of the target payload to the programmable device128. The programmable device 128 can also include the monitoring agent1804 to verify that the internal security keys are valid for the contentof the target payload 1420.

The device data and tracking system 2334 can log the provisioning of thedevices. After the provision device module 2610 has been completed, thecontrol flow can be transferred to the generate validation status module2612.

The generate validation status module 2612 can validate the programmabledevices 128 after it has been provisioned. The generate validationstatus module 2612 can retrieve information about the programmabledevices 128 via the programming unit 110 having the programmer 112 andthe security controller 114. The generate validation status module 2612can generate a device validation status 2622 to indicate if theprogrammable device 128 has been provisioned correctly.

The device validation status 2622 can be determined in a variety ofways. For example, the device validation status 2622 can have a truevalue when a module list 2630 in the job control package 1418 matchesthe list of object and modules in the programmable devices 128. Inanother example, the device validation status 2622 can be set based onthe validation of a hash value calculated for the content of theprogrammable device 128. The device validation status 2622 can be setbased on another status value provided by the security kernel 2620.After the generate validation status module 2612 has been completed, thecontrol flow can be transferred to the generate report module 2614.

The generate report module 2614 can generate a validation report 2624 onthe status of the provisioning of the programmable device 128. Thevalidation report 2624 can be based on each individual programmabledevice 128 or the set of devices being programmed.

Based on the validation report 2624, the programming unit 110 caninstruct the programmer 112 to invalidate the programmable devices 128that do not pass validation. The programmer 112 can physically move theinvalid devices to a disposal station or mark the devices as invalid.

The validation report 2624 can also be sent to the factory managementsystem 2330 for distribution to other system to identify theprogrammable devices 128 and their device validation status 2622. Theinformation of the validation report 2624 can be used to detect theinappropriate use of the programmable devices 128, such as the existenceof counterfeit devices, duplicate devices, invalid devices, and othersimilar device conditions.

Other examples of these and other embodiments are found throughout thisdisclosure.

4.0. Example Embodiments

Examples of some embodiments are represented, without limitation, in thefollowing clauses and use cases:

According to an embodiment, a method of operation of a secureprogramming system comprises receiving a job control package having asecurity kernel and a target payload, installing the security kernel ina programmable device mounted in a programmer, rebooting theprogrammable device in the programmer by activating the security kernel,validating the security kernel of the programmable device based on avalidation code, and provisioning the programmable device with thetarget payload.

In an embodiment, the method further comprises rebooting theprogrammable device includes sending a reboot command to theprogrammable device mounted in the programmer.

In an embodiment, the method further comprises retrieving a siliconvendor device certificate from the programmable device, extracting asilicon vendor public key from the target payload, generating thevalidation code by authenticating the silicon vendor device certificatewith the silicon vendor public key, extracting an identification tokenfrom the silicon vendor device certificate, the identification tokenencrypted by the silicon vendor device public key, and authenticatingthe identification token using a silicon vendor device private key.

According to an embodiment, a method of operation of a secureprogramming system comprises receiving a job control package at aprogrammer, the job control package having a target payload, mounting aprogrammable device in the programmer, generating a device certificatefor the programmable device, the device certificate having anauthentication key and a decryption key, embedding the devicecertificate into a secure storage unit of the programmable device,encrypting the target payload using an encryption key linked to thedecryption key, and provisioning the programmable device with anencrypted payload having the target payload.

In an embodiment, the method further comprises generating the devicecertificate includes generating the device certificate having a deviceidentification of the programmable device.

In an embodiment, the method further comprises receiving an encryptedpayload in the target payload, decrypting the encrypted payload with adecryption key, and installing the encrypted payload in an unencryptedformat into the programmable device.

In an embodiment, the method further comprises receiving an encryptedpayload in the target payload, the encrypted payload encrypted with asigning key, and verifying the encrypted payload with a verification keylinked with the signing key.

According to an embodiment, a secure programming system comprises aprogramming unit configured to receive a job control package having asecurity kernel and a target payload, a programmer of the programmingunit configured to install the security kernel in a programmable devicemounted in the programmer, reboot the programmable device in theprogrammer by activating the security kernel, and provision theprogrammable device with the target payload, and a security controllerof the programming unit configured to validate the security kernel ofthe programmable device based on a validation code received from thesecurity kernel after rebooting.

In an embodiment, the system further comprises the programmer configuredto send a reboot command to the programmable device mounted in theprogrammer.

In an embodiment, the system further comprises the programmer configuredto retrieve a silicon vendor device certificate from the programmabledevice, and the security controller configured to extract a siliconvendor public key from the target payload, to generate the validationcode by authenticating the silicon vendor device certificate with thesilicon vendor public key, to extract an identification token from thesilicon vendor device certificate, the identification token encrypted bythe silicon vendor device public key, and to authenticate theidentification token using a silicon vendor device private key.

In an embodiment, the system further comprises the security controllerconfigured to extract a firmware image from the target payload and todecrypt the firmware image, and the programmer configured to copy thefirmware image to the programmable device.

In an embodiment, the system further comprises the programming unitincludes the security controller configured to calculate a devicevalidation status based on a module list of the programmable devicematching another module list of the target payload and configured toinsert the device validation status into a validation report.

In an embodiment, the system further comprises the programming unitconfigured to receive the security kernel in an encrypted format in thejob control package, the security controller configured to decrypt thesecurity kernel with a public key pre-loaded in a programming unit, andthe programmer configured to install the security kernel in anunencrypted format into the programmable device.

In an embodiment, the system further comprises a hardware securitymodule outside the programming unit configured to encrypt the securitykernel with a programmer public key, an OEM public key, or a siliconvendor public key and to form the job control package with the securitykernel in an encrypted format.

According to an embodiment, one or more non-transitory computer-readablemedia storing instructions that, when executed by one or more computingdevices, cause receiving a job control package having a security kerneland a target payload, installing the security kernel in a programmabledevice mounted in a programmer, rebooting the programmable device in theprogrammer by activating the security kernel, validating the securitykernel of the programmable device based on a validation code, andprovisioning the programmable device with the target payload.

In an embodiment, the non-transitory computer-readable media furthercomprises rebooting the programmable device includes sending a rebootcommand to the programmable device mounted in the programmer.

In an embodiment, the non-transitory computer-readable media furthercomprises retrieving a silicon vendor device certificate from theprogrammable device, extracting a silicon vendor public key from thetarget payload, generating the validation code by authenticating thesilicon vendor device certificate with the silicon vendor public key,extracting an identification token from the silicon vendor devicecertificate, the identification token encrypted by the silicon vendordevice public key, and authenticating the identification token using asilicon vendor device private key.

In an embodiment, the non-transitory computer-readable media furthercomprises extracting a firmware image from the target payload,decrypting the firmware image, and copying the firmware image to theprogrammable device.

In an embodiment, the non-transitory computer-readable media furthercomprises calculating a device validation status based on a module listof the programmable device matching another module list of the targetpayload, and inserting the device validation status into a validationreport.

In an embodiment, the non-transitory computer-readable media furthercomprises receiving the security kernel in an encrypted format in thejob control package, decrypting the security kernel with a public keypre-loaded in a programming unit, and installing the security kernel inan unencrypted format into the programmable device.

5.0. Implementation Mechanism—Hardware Overview

According to one embodiment, the techniques described herein areimplemented by one or more special-purpose computing devices. Thespecial-purpose computing devices may be desktop computer systems,portable computer systems, handheld devices, smartphones, media devices,gaming consoles, networking devices, or any other device thatincorporates hard-wired and/or program logic to implement thetechniques. The special-purpose computing devices may be hard-wired toperform the techniques, or may include digital electronic devices suchas one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) or fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGAs) that are persistently programmed toperform the techniques, or may include one or more general purposehardware processors programmed to perform the techniques pursuant toprogram instructions in firmware, memory, other storage, or acombination. Such special-purpose computing devices may also combinecustom hard-wired logic, ASICs, or FPGAs with custom programming toaccomplish the techniques.

FIG. 27 illustrates a block diagram that showing a computer system 2700utilized in implementing the above-described techniques, according to anembodiment. Computer system 2700 may be, for example, a desktopcomputing device, laptop computing device, tablet, smartphone, serverappliance, computing mainframe, multimedia device, handheld device,networking apparatus, or any other suitable device.

Computer system 2700 includes one or more busses 2702 or othercommunication mechanism for communicating information, and one or morehardware processors 2704 coupled with busses 2702 for processinginformation. Hardware processors 2704 may be, for example, a generalpurpose microprocessor. Busses 2702 may include various internal and/orexternal components, including, without limitation, internal processoror memory busses, a Serial ATA bus, a PCI Express bus, a UniversalSerial Bus, a HyperTransport bus, an Infiniband bus, and/or any othersuitable wired or wireless communication channel.

Computer system 2700 also includes a main memory 2706, such as a randomaccess memory (RAM) or other dynamic or volatile storage device, coupledto bus 2702 for storing information and instructions to be executed byprocessor 2704. Main memory 2706 also may be used for storing temporaryvariables or other intermediate information during execution ofinstructions to be executed by processor 2704. Such instructions, whenstored in non-transitory storage media accessible to processor 2704,render computer system 2700 into a special-purpose machine that iscustomized to perform the operations specified in the instructions.

Computer system 2700 further includes one or more read only memories(ROM) 2708 or other static storage devices coupled to bus 2702 forstoring static information and instructions for processor 2704. One ormore storage devices 2710, such as a solid-state drive (SSD), magneticdisk, optical disk, or other suitable non-volatile storage device, isprovided and coupled to bus 2702 for storing information andinstructions.

Computer system 2700 may be coupled via bus 2702 to one or more displays2712 for presenting information to a computer user. For instance,computer system 2700 may be connected via a High-Definition MultimediaInterface (HDMI) cable or other suitable cabling to a Liquid CrystalDisplay (LCD) monitor, and/or via a wireless connection such aspeer-to-peer Wi-Fi Direct connection to a Light-Emitting Diode (LED)television. Other examples of suitable types of displays 2712 mayinclude, without limitation, plasma display devices, projectors, cathoderay tube (CRT) monitors, electronic paper, virtual reality headsets,braille terminal, and/or any other suitable device for outputtinginformation to a computer user. In an embodiment, any suitable type ofoutput device, such as, for instance, an audio speaker or printer, maybe utilized instead of a display 2712.

In an embodiment, output to display 2712 may be accelerated by one ormore graphics processing unit (GPUs) in computer system 2700. A GPU maybe, for example, a highly parallelized, multi-core floating pointprocessing unit highly optimized to perform computing operations relatedto the display of graphics data, 3D data, and/or multimedia. In additionto computing image and/or video data directly for output to display2712, a GPU may also be used to render imagery or other video dataoff-screen, and read that data back into a program for off-screen imageprocessing with very high performance. Various other computing tasks maybe off-loaded from the processor 2704 to the GPU.

One or more input devices 2714 are coupled to bus 2702 for communicatinginformation and command selections to processor 2704. One example of aninput device 2714 is a keyboard, including alphanumeric and other keys.Another type of user input device 2714 is cursor control 2716, such as amouse, a trackball, or cursor direction keys for communicating directioninformation and command selections to processor 2704 and for controllingcursor movement on display 2712. This input device typically has twodegrees of freedom in two axes, a first axis (e.g., x) and a second axis(e.g., y), that allows the device to specify positions in a plane. Yetother examples of suitable input devices 2714 include a touch-screenpanel affixed to a display 2712, cameras, microphones, accelerometers,motion detectors, and/or other sensors. In an embodiment, anetwork-based input device 2714 may be utilized. In such an embodiment,user input and/or other information or commands may be relayed viarouters and/or switches on a Local Area Network (LAN) or other suitableshared network, or via a peer-to-peer network, from the input device2714 to a network link 2720 on the computer system 2700.

A computer system 2700 may implement techniques described herein usingcustomized hard-wired logic, one or more ASICs or FPGAs, firmware and/orprogram logic which in combination with the computer system causes orprograms computer system 2700 to be a special-purpose machine. Accordingto one embodiment, the techniques herein are performed by computersystem 2700 in response to processor 2704 executing one or moresequences of one or more instructions contained in main memory 2706.Such instructions may be read into main memory 2706 from another storagemedium, such as storage device 2710. Execution of the sequences ofinstructions contained in main memory 2706 causes processor 2704 toperform the process steps described herein. In alternative embodiments,hard-wired circuitry may be used in place of or in combination withsoftware instructions.

The term “storage media” as used herein refers to any non-transitorymedia that store data and/or instructions that cause a machine tooperate in a specific fashion. Such storage media may comprisenon-volatile media and/or volatile media. Non-volatile media includes,for example, optical or magnetic disks, such as storage device 2710.Volatile media includes dynamic memory, such as main memory 2706. Commonforms of storage media include, for example, a floppy disk, a flexibledisk, hard disk, solid state drive, magnetic tape, or any other magneticdata storage medium, a CD-ROM, any other optical data storage medium,any physical medium with patterns of holes, a RAM, a PROM, and EPROM, aFLASH-EPROM, NVRAM, any other memory chip or cartridge.

Storage media is distinct from but may be used in conjunction withtransmission media. Transmission media participates in transferringinformation between storage media. For example, transmission mediaincludes coaxial cables, copper wire and fiber optics, including thewires that comprise bus 2702. Transmission media can also take the formof acoustic or light waves, such as those generated during radio-waveand infra-red data communications.

Various forms of media may be involved in carrying one or more sequencesof one or more instructions to processor 2704 for execution. Forexample, the instructions may initially be carried on a magnetic disk orsolid state drive of a remote computer. The remote computer can load theinstructions into its dynamic memory and use a modem to send theinstructions over a network, such as a cable network or cellularnetwork, as modulated signals. A modem local to computer system 2700 canreceive the data on the network and demodulate the signal to decode thetransmitted instructions. Appropriate circuitry can then place the dataon bus 2702. Bus 2702 carries the data to main memory 2706, from whichprocessor 2704 retrieves and executes the instructions. The instructionsreceived by main memory 2706 may optionally be stored on storage device2710 either before or after execution by processor 2704.

A computer system 2700 may also include, in an embodiment, one or morecommunication interfaces 2718 coupled to bus 2702. A communicationinterface 2718 provides a data communication coupling, typicallytwo-way, to a network link 2720 that is connected to a local network2722. For example, a communication interface 2718 may be an integratedservices digital network (ISDN) card, cable modem, satellite modem, or amodem to provide a data communication connection to a corresponding typeof telephone line. As another example, the one or more communicationinterfaces 2718 may include a local area network (LAN) card to provide adata communication connection to a compatible LAN. As yet anotherexample, the one or more communication interfaces 2718 may include awireless network interface controller, such as an 802.11-basedcontroller, Bluetooth controller, Long Term Evolution (LTE) modem,and/or other types of wireless interfaces. In any such implementation,communication interface 2718 sends and receives electrical,electromagnetic, or optical signals that carry digital data streamsrepresenting various types of information.

Network link 2720 typically provides data communication through one ormore networks to other data devices. For example, network link 2720 mayprovide a connection through local network 2722 to a host computer 2724or to data equipment operated by a Service Provider 2726. The ServiceProvider 2726, which may for example be an Internet Service Provider(ISP), in turn provides data communication services through a wide areanetwork, such as the world wide packet data communication network nowcommonly referred to as the “Internet” 2728. Local network 2722 andInternet 2728 both use electrical, electromagnetic or optical signalsthat carry digital data streams. The signals through the variousnetworks and the signals on network link 2720 and through communicationinterface 2718, which carry the digital data to and from computer system2700, are example forms of transmission media.

In an embodiment, computer system 2700 can send messages and receivedata, including program code and/or other types of instructions, throughthe network(s), network link 2720, and communication interface 2718. Inthe Internet example, a server 2730 might transmit a requested code foran application program through Internet 2728, the Service Provider 2726,local network 2722 and communication interface 2718. The received codemay be executed by hardware processors 2704 as it is received, and/orstored in storage device 2710, or other non-volatile storage for laterexecution. As another example, information received via a network link2720 may be interpreted and/or processed by a software component of thecomputer system 2700, such as a web browser, application, or server,which in turn issues instructions based thereon to a hardware processor2704, possibly via an operating system and/or other intermediate layersof software components.

In an embodiment, some or all of the systems described herein may be orcomprise server computer systems, including one or more computer systems2700 that collectively implement various components of the system as aset of server-side processes. The server computer systems may includeweb server, application server, database server, and/or otherconventional server components that certain above-described componentsutilize to provide the described functionality. The server computersystems may receive network-based communications comprising input datafrom any of a variety of sources, including without limitationuser-operated client computing devices such as desktop computers,tablets, or smartphones, remote sensing devices, and/or other servercomputer systems.

In an embodiment, certain server components may be implemented in fullor in part using “cloud”-based components that are coupled to thesystems by one or more networks, such as the Internet. The cloud-basedcomponents may expose interfaces by which they provide processing,storage, software, and/or other resources to other components of thesystems. In an embodiment, the cloud-based components may be implementedby third-party entities, on behalf of another entity for whom thecomponents are deployed. In other embodiments, however, the describedsystems may be implemented entirely by computer systems owned andoperated by a single entity.

In an embodiment, an apparatus comprises a processor and is configuredto perform any of the foregoing methods. In an embodiment, anon-transitory computer readable storage medium, storing softwareinstructions, which when executed by one or more processors causeperformance of any of the foregoing methods.

6.0. Extensions and Alternatives

As used herein, the terms “first,” “second,” “certain,” and “particular”are used as naming conventions to distinguish queries, plans,representations, steps, objects, devices, or other items from eachother, so that these items may be referenced after they have beenintroduced. Unless otherwise specified herein, the use of these termsdoes not imply an ordering, timing, or any other characteristic of thereferenced items.

In the drawings, the various components are depicted as beingcommunicatively coupled to various other components by arrows. Thesearrows illustrate only certain examples of information flows between thecomponents. Neither the direction of the arrows nor the lack of arrowlines between certain components should be interpreted as indicating theexistence or absence of communication between the certain componentsthemselves. Indeed, each component may feature a suitable communicationinterface by which the component may become communicatively coupled toother components as needed to accomplish any of the functions describedherein.

In the foregoing specification, embodiments of the invention have beendescribed with reference to numerous specific details that may vary fromimplementation to implementation. Thus, the sole and exclusive indicatorof what is the invention, and is intended by the applicants to be theinvention, is the set of claims that issue from this application, in thespecific form in which such claims issue, including any subsequentcorrection. In this regard, although specific claim dependencies are setout in the claims of this application, it is to be noted that thefeatures of the dependent claims of this application may be combined asappropriate with the features of other dependent claims and with thefeatures of the independent claims of this application, and not merelyaccording to the specific dependencies recited in the set of claims.Moreover, although separate embodiments are discussed herein, anycombination of embodiments and/or partial embodiments discussed hereinmay be combined to form further embodiments.

Any definitions expressly set forth herein for terms contained in suchclaims shall govern the meaning of such terms as used in the claims.Hence, no limitation, element, property, feature, advantage or attributethat is not expressly recited in a claim should limit the scope of suchclaim in any way. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to beregarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of operation of a secure programmingsystem comprising: receiving a job control package having a securitykernel and a target payload; installing the security kernel in aprogrammable device mounted in a programmer; rebooting the programmabledevice in the programmer by activating the security kernel; validatingthe security kernel of the programmable device based on a validationcode; and provisioning the programmable device with the target payload.